Stanley L. Wade v. F. C. Stangl III : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Stanley L. Wade v. F. C. Stangl III : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James I. Watts; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Stephen G. Crockett; Giauque, Crockett & Bendinger; Daniel A. Jensen; Kimball, Parr, Waddoups,
Brown & Gee; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stanley L. Wade v. F. C. Stangl III, No. 920221 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4139
IN 'THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STANLEY L 
Plain 
vs. 
P. C. STANGL IIIf 
Defendant-Appellee, 
" * ^ v *? ^ o 3 " A ? ) "i — f A 
P r i o r i t y No. 16 
BRIH*'•'" 
JLJ C U T * . %.< V . W U 4 4 W J f *•- *.. 
ichael R, Murphy, 
ourx 
Utah 
: Judge 
Jarae? 
At t o 
124 l 
S a l t 
or Appellant 
*^0 East 
:y, Utah 84102 
Stephen G. Cr-..;-. 
Giauque, Crockett & Bendinger 
Attorneys for Appellee 
136 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Daniel A, Jensen 
Kimbal1, Parr, Waddoups, 
Brown & Gee 
Attorneys for Appellee 
185 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STANLEY L. WADE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
F. C. STANGL III, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Case No. 920221-CA 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
On Appeal from the Judgment of 
the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge 
James I. Watts 
Attorney for Appellant 
124 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Stephen G. Crockett 
Giauque, Crockett & Bendinger 
Attorneys for Appellee 
136 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Daniel A. Jensen 
Kimbal1, Parr, Waddoups, 
Brown & Gee 
Attorneys for Appellee 
185 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS . . . 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 4 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW . 5 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 7 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 12 
I. THE JUDGE IN THIS CASE WAS CLEARLY BIASED AGAINST 
WADE AND THIS BIAS PREVENTED WADE FROM RECEIVING A 
FAIR TRIAL 12 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT BASED ITS DECISION ON IMPROPER 
ISSUES AND UNALLOWABLE EVIDENCE 15 
A. It was Prejudicial Error for the District 
Court to Allow Stangl to Raise the Issue of 
An "Oral Agreement" for the First Time at 
Trial Without Allowing Wade to Rebut the 
Argument on the Grounds of the Statute of 
Frauds and Statute of Limitations 15 
1. The Alleged Oral Contract Between Stangl 
and Wade Violated the Statute of 
Frauds 19 
ii 
2. The Action Brought by Stangl Upon The 
Alleged Oral Agreement Was Barred by the 
Statute of Limitations 21 
B. The District Court's Determination that the 
Parties Agreed to Allocate Taxes Based Upon 
the Proportionate Sizes of Their Parcels Was 
Clearly Erroneous As a Matter of Law . . . 22 
III. AS INSTRUCTED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT, THE ONLY 
APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF TAXES IN THIS CASE WAS 
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION . . . 25 
A. The Only Appropriate Method of Allocating 
Taxes Under the Doctrine of Equitable 
Conversion is Based Upon the Relative Value 
of Each Parties1 Property 28 
CONCLUSION 29 
iii 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES Page 
Aldridae v. State, 342 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1960) 12 
Bamberger Co. v. Certified Prods., Inc., 48 P.2d 489 
(Utah 1936), adhered to 53 P.2d 1153 (Utah 1935) . . . 20 
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah App. 1987) . . 16, 17 
Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 267 P. 1020 
(Utah 1928) 20 
De Haas v. Empire Petro. Co., 435 F.2d 1223,- 1229 
(CA10 Colo. 1970) 18 
Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436, 439 
(CA10 Okla. 1979), cert, den. 445 U.S. 964, 64 L.Ed.2d 
239, 100 S.Ct. 1653 (1980) 18 
Frausto v. Legal Aid Soc. 563 F.2d 1324 (CA9 1977) . . . . 12 
Free v. Little. 88 P. 407 (Utah 1907) 27 
General Ins. Co. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 
502, 506 (Utah 1976) 16 
George J. Cooke Co. v. Fred Miller Brewing Co., 146 N.E. 
459 (111. 1925) 25 
Hardy v. Ward, 150 N.C. 385, 64 S.E. 171 (1909) 23 
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. East Coast Truck, 
547 F.2d 888, 890 (CA5 1977) 18 
Johnson v. Jones, 164 P.2d 893 (Utah 1946) 28 
Maine Milk Producers. Inc. v. Commissioner of Agric. Food 
& Rural Resources. 483 A.2d 1213 (Me. 1984) 28 
Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., 194 P.2d 992 (Or. 1948) . . . . 24 
Milligan v. Stone. 424 F.Supp. 1088 (S.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd 
548 F.2d 878 (CA9 Cal. 1977), cert, den. 432 U.S. 908, 
53 L.Ed.2d 1081, 97 S.Ct. 2955 (1977) 12 
iv
CASES CONTINUED 
Mineral Indus. & Heavy Constr. Group v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Review Com.. 639 F.2d 1289 
(5th Cir. 1981) 18 
National Importing & Trading Co. v. E. A. Bear & Co., 
155 N.E. 343 (111. 1925) 25 
New York C. R. Co. v. Mohnev, 252 U.S. 152, 64 L. Ed. 
502, 40 S. Ct. 287 (1920) 25 
People Ex rel. Little v. Saint Louis Merchants' 
Bridge Co. . 118 N.E. 733 (111. 1918) 12 
Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 
806 (Utah 1979) 24 
R. A. Pohl Constr. Co. v. Marshall, 640 F.2d 266, 
267 (CA10 1981) 17 
Simms v. Andrews. 118 F.2d 803, 807 (CA10 Okla. 1941) . . . 18 
Southern Acid & Sulphur Co. v. Childs, 184 S.W.2d 586 
(Ark. 1945) 25 
Suitter v. Thompson, 358 P.2d 267 (Or. 1960) . 25 
Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797 (Utah 
App. 1992) 3 
United States Transmission Systems, Inc., v. Board of 
Assessment Appeals, 715 P.2d 1249 (Colo. 1986) . . . . 28 
United States v. Conforte. 457 F. Supp. 641 (D.C. Nev. 1978), 
aff'd 624 F.2d 869 (CA9 Nev. 1980), cert, den. 101 
S.Ct. 568 (1980) 12 
United States v. Sciuto, 531 F.2d 842 (CA7 1976) 12 
United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527 (CA3 1973) 12 
Wade v. Stanol. C-87-357 4 
Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical Attractions of Palm 
Beach Inc., 833 F.2d 1484, 1487 (CA11 Fla. 1987) . . . 17 
v 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
12 A.L.R. 412, 414 (1921) 27 
77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser § 326 (1975) 27 
77 Am.Jur.2d Vendors and Purchasers, § 63 (1975) 28 
Annotations, Effect of Delay in Making Conveyance, 
12 A.L.R. 416, 417 (1975) 27 
Fed. R.Civ.P. 15 (B) 16 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 25-5-4 19 
Utah R.Civ.P. 15(b) 16 
vi 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STANLEY 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs, ; 
F. C. STANGL III, j 
Defendant-Appellee• ) 
, case No. 920221-CA 
1 Priority No. v^> 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STANLEY L. WADE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Stanley j "Wade") appeal:; .* decision r 
I'h :i " . : « *• . i 
The distric JI* favor 1 the appellee and appellant 
contests ,: ; ruling. The Utah Court f Appeals has jurisdiction 
over I: lii - ; pur siicinf; I 11 lit all 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Was the district court judge in this case biased 
against Wade to an extent which prevented Wade from receiving a 
fair trial? 
2. Was it prejudicial error for the district court to 
allow F, C. Stangl III ("Stangl") to raise the issue of an 
alleged "oral agreement" for the first time at trial without 
allowing Wade to rebut that argument on the basis of the Statute 
of Frauds and the Statute of Limitations? 
3. Did the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of 
Limitations require the district court to find that the alleged 
oral agreement could not form the basis for an assumption by Wade 
of an obligation to pay more than his share of property taxes? 
4. Was the district court's determination that the parties 
agreed to allocate taxes based upon the proportionate sizes of 
their parcels clearly erroneous as a matter of law? 
5. Absent mutual consent by the parties to cillocate taxes 
based upon acreage, was the district court required to apply the 
doctrine of equitable conversion, as instructed by the Utah 
Supreme Court, to determine the appropriate allocation of taxes 
based upon value? 
2 
Standard of Review 
The i striiues abo1 'H pi"eapl,i,+ " pnf? ? i on* • I LIS» - n"C! and quest ions of 
1 aw Therefore, this Court i:-. u- : required - accord any 
deference ~ *••- district court - Eindings relative these 
i ssues, v:i ew th< : •.•!•  rown of Alt a 
v. Ben Hame Corp,, 836 P.2d (Utah App I 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four year s: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, 
or liability not founded upon an instrument 
in writing 
Ut a h Code Is nn § 25- 5 -4 Certain agreements voi* 
and subscribed. 
In the following cases every agreement shall be void 
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not 
to be performed within one year from the 
making thereof. 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt 
default or miscarriage of another. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case involving the review of the district court's 
decision in Wade v. Stanql, C-87-357. 
This case began as an action seeking to compel the 
conveyance of title to a parcel of land. An issue arose 
regarding a party's alleged failure to pay property taxes. 
On an appeal from a summary judgment, the Utah Supreme Court 
found no contractual default as a result of the alleged failure 
to pay property taxes. The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case 
to the district court for a determination of the taxes properly 
attributable to the parties under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion. 
The district court did not proceed under that doctrine and 
instead, found, erroneously, that the intent of the written 
contract was to allocate the taxes based upon acreage. 
This appeal is brought contesting the district court's 
judgment. Specifically, appellant requests this Court to remand 
the case to the district court with specific instructions to 
allocate property taxes between the parties under the doctrine of 
equitable conversion based upon the value of the property. 
Further, appellant requests this Court to order Appellee to 
transfer title to him pursuant to their contract. 
4 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS hMI) DISPOSITION BELOW 
On Jr/nuicJi v ,'""0 Il "L#8 111 d J irit; i 11-appe I. La mil' l iatJe I i J. H I i a 
contract action attempting to obtain the warranty deed to 
property which he had purchased from defendant-appellee Stangl. 
The contract pri ce for th i s pr oper ty hac een paid in hi J I l»y 
January 1985. (See Affidavit: of Stanley . , : , attached hereto 
as Exhibit A) •"• r eci an .Amended Answer and Counterclaim 
contending that Wade Dreached the contract ."a :i ] :ii ng t : pa} 
property taxes and therefore was not entitled * :onveyance of 
t:i tj e. 
On October ?n I ^ S Q ~~ appeal from summary judgment entered 
by district court . i Stangl ] : h * h r^r. Supreme found 
1 i :);pei: ty taxes 
in dispute. The Utah Supreme Court vacated - summary judgment 
and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to 
det: enn i ne t he amount < > I I'.axus at: l;.i i but at» I e to Wade , in propei I: y 
under the doctrine ,.- equitable conversion, ' 
On remand, rr? district court did init determine the amount 
o t I axew at. 1 r J b It u U'anJi"" • pi i ipe i I \ unde i I he ,Joct i i lie el 
equitable conversion as instructed by the Utah Supreme Court. 
i 
Specifically, the Court stated that "LtJhe contract does not impose on the buyer any obligation 
to pay real property taxes except in the year 1978, and buyer is not therefore in default under the contract 
for non-payment of taxes. Appellant agrees that he is obligated to pay taxes actually accruing to his land, 
by reason of the doctrine of equitable conversion. However, the amount of taxes assessed since the year 1978 
attributable to the parcel purchased and possessed by appellant is still in dispute." Remittitur No. 890256, 
Oct 27 1989, attached hereto as Exhibit B 
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The district court found, instead, that the parties had agreed to 
allocate taxes based upon acreage rather than value. 
Specifically, the court found "that it was the parties1 intent at 
the time of execution of the written agreement and thereafter 
that the taxes should be apportioned based on the respective 
amount of land owned by each party." Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 4, attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
The court based this finding upon two alternative theories. 
First, that letters and documents sent by Stangl to Wade showing 
Stanglfs calculations of taxes based upon acreage (versus value) 
of land indicated such an intent. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 4 (See Exhibit C). Second, that the 
parties had reached an oral agreement to base the taxes on 
acreage rather than value, and said oral agreement was either a 
separate and subsequent contract concerning property tax 
allocation, or an oral clarification or modification of the 1978 
written contract. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 4 
(See Exhibit C). 
Based upon the above factors, the district court awarded 
judgment in Stangl1s favor in the amount of $100,699.90. This 
consisted of $54,835 in taxes, $19,817 in interest, and 
$26,047.90 in attorney's fees. Judgment, p. 2, attached hereto 
as Exhibit D. Including post-judgment interest, Wade has paid 
6 
$106,386.97 to Stangl. See Partial Satisfaction of Judgment, 
attached hereto as Exhibit E. However, he still has not received 
title to his property. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On May 16, 1978, Wade and Stangl entered into a written 
installment land contract whereby Wade agreed to purchase 6.87 
acres of property from Stangl for $206,100. See Agreement, 
attached hereto as Exhibit F. 
2. The property sold was located at approximately 9200 
South, 700 East, Sandy City, Utah. The 6.87 acres purchased by 
Wade ("Wade's property") were part of a larger, 9.63 acre tract 
of land owned by Stangl. Stangl retained ownership of the 
remaining 2.76 acres. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
p. 2 (See Exhibit C). 
3. Wade's property is situated behind Stangl's retained 
property with respect to 700 East Street, and is accessed by a 
50-foot wide strip of land which also serves as a non-exclusive 
right-of-way for access to Stangl's property. Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, p. 3 (See Exhibit C). 
4. Pursuant to the 1978 contract, Wade paid Stangl the 
agreed-upon purchase price of $206,100. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 3 (See Exhibit C). Final payment occurred 
in approximately January, 1985 (See Exhibit A). 
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5. Paragraph 6 of the 1978 written contract provides that 
n[r]eal property taxes for the year 1978 shall be prorated at the 
closing.11 Thus, the parties prorated the 1978 taxes based on (1) 
the number of days of the year each party owned the property, and 
(2) the area (square footage) owned by each party as compared to 
the total area of the 9.63-acre consolidated tract. Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 3 (See Exhibit C). 
6. The parties intended and assumed that they would be 
separately taxed on their respective parcels following the year 
of the closing (1978). The county taxing authorities, however, 
continued to assess the entire 9.68-acre consolidated tract and 
did not individually tax the parties1 separate parcels until 
1991. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 3 (See Exhibit 
C); Stipulation of Parties, p. 2, attached hereto as Exhibit G. 
7. Following 1979, Stangl continued to be taixed for the 
consolidated property. Stangl, in turn, charged Wade 71.34% of 
the taxes based on square footage or acreage owned by Wade as 
compared to the total amount of land within the consolidated 
tract.2 See letters and correspondence from Stangl to Wade, 
attached hereto as Exhibit H; Memo in opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 8, attached hereto as Exhibit I. 
2 
A calculation of property tax allocation based upon value would have resulted in Wade being 
responsible for approximately 56.66% of the taxes. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 7; Affidavit of A. Paul Schwenke; valuation form, all attached hereto as Exhibit K. 
8 
8. Wade paid the taxes for the years 1979-1981 based upon 
Stangl's calculations (See Exhibit G, para. 12). Wade contends 
that these payments were made each year under the understanding 
that Stangl intended to have the property split for tax purposes 
prior to the next tax year. See Transcript, p. 68, attached 
hereto as Exhibit J. 
9. Wade contends that in 1982 he discovered he had paid 
and was paying substantially more taxes than, had actually accrued 
to his property. Affidavit of Stanley L. Wade, (See Exhibit A). 
Therefore, between the years of 1982 and 1991, Wade did not make 
payments based upon Stanglfs calculations of apportionment based 
on acreage. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 3 (See 
Exhibit C). 
10. Pursuant to the judgment of the court below,3 Wade has 
paid $106,386.97, including post judgment interest, to Stangl 
(See Exhibit E). The calculation of taxes by the district court 
was based upon acreage, not value. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 11, (See Exhibit C). 
Judgment by the district court for $54,835 in taxes, $19,817 in interest, and 26,047.90 in 
attorney's fees, amounting to $100,699.90. Judgment, p. 2 (See Exhibit D). The difference between this figure 
and the $106,386.97 figure is post-judgment interest. 
9 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Wade requests this Court to order appellee Stangl 
to convey title of Wade's property to him pursuant to their 
written contract. Wade also seeks an order from this Court 
remanding this case to the district court with instructions to 
determine the proper amount of taxes attributable to his property 
under the doctrine of equitable conversion. Further, Wade 
requests this Court to instruct the district, court to determine 
said taxes based upon the value of the respective parties1 
property. 
As justification for these requests, Wade intends to show 
that the district court's determination of this matter was 
clearly erroneous as a matter of law. Wade contends that the 
judge in this case was biased against Wade and that this bias 
prevented him from receiving a fair trial. In fact, the results 
of this case can be explained in no other way, as the law clearly 
supports Wade's positions. 
The district court found that the parties entered into an 
oral contract, or orally modified the existing contract to 
provide for allocation of taxes based upon acreage. Wade 
contends that this finding was improper. The issue of such an 
oral contract had never been raised prior to trial. The district 
court not only allowed Stangl to raise it at that point, but 
10 
refused to allow Wade to rebut the issue because he had not 
affirmatively pled the defenses prior to trial. How Wade could 
have affirmatively defended issues which had not yet been raised, 
and of which he was unaware, is unclear. 
The affirmative defenses which Wade attempted to raise at 
trial barred the admission of the new issue. First, the newly 
alleged oral contract or orally modified contract was subject to 
the statute of frauds. In fact, the Statute of Frauds clearly 
voided such an alleged contract. Second, any action brought by 
Stangl upon the alleged oral agreement was barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
The district court found, as an alternative to the oral 
contract theory, that under the written contract the parties 
intended to base tax allocation upon acreage rather than value. 
This finding is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's statements 
in its Remittitur and clearly inconsistent with applicable laws. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated that under the contract there 
was no obligation on Wade's part to pay taxes. Additionally, 
they recognized the applicability of the doctrine of equitable 
conversion as the proper basis upon which to allocate taxes. 
Under that doctrine, taxes actually attributable to a party's 
property are to be assessed to that party. These taxes must not 
be based upon the acreage of the parcels, as the district court 
11 
based them, but upon the relative value of the parties1 property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JUDGE IN THIS CASE WAS CLEARLY BIASED AGAINST WADE AND 
THIS BIAS PREVENTED WADE FROM RECEIVING A FAIR TRIAL 
11A litigant is entitled to a trial before a judge who is not 
biased or prejudiced. . ." 48A C.J.S. §108, p. 728.4 This 
right is based upon the "due process clause of the federal 
Constitution,5 and on the constitutional right to a fair trial. 
. . ."
6
 Id. 
Where a party charges that bias or prejudice unjustly 
affected the results of a trial, the court on review is required 
to "carefully scrutinize the record to see that no injustice has 
been done the complaining party."7 48A C.J.S. § 108, p. 730. 
In the case at hand, there was pervasive evidence of 
judicial bias. As a result, Wade was unable to obtain a fair 
trial in this matter. 
Frausto v. Legal Aid Soc. 563 F.2d 1324 (CA9 1977); United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527 (CA3 
1973). 
5
 United States v. Sciuto, 531 F.2d 842 (CA7 1976); United States v. Conforte, 457 F. Supp. 641 (D.C. 
Nev. 1978), aff'd 624 F.2d 869 (CA9 Nev. 1980), cert, den. 101 S.Ct. 568 (1980); MiLliaan v. Stone, 424 F.Supp. 
1088 (S.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd 548 F.2d 878 (CA9 Cal. 1977), cert, den. 432 U.S. 908, 53 L.Ed.2d 1081, 97 S.Ct. 
2955 (1977). 
6
 Conforte, 457 F.Supp. 641 (D.C. Nev. 1978). 
7
 People Ex rel. Little v. Saint Louis Merchants' Bridge Co., 118 N.E. 733 (III. 1918); Aldridge v. 
State, 342 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1960). 
12 
The judge in this case recused himself from hearing certain 
portions of the case as a result of difficulties he had with 
Wade's prior counsel. Apparently, Paul Schwenke, one of Wade's 
attorneys felt that the judge's rulings were so inconsistent with 
the law and out of line with instructions from the Utah Supreme 
Court that he believed Judge Murphy was personally prejudiced 
against him. He wrote a letter to Judge Murphy to that effect. 
The judge was affronted by the suggestion of, bias and referred 
the matter to the bar. 
The Judge also commented at trial that he had had 
difficulties with another successor counsel of Wade's. As a 
result, the Judge recused himself from deciding particular issues 
which he felt might be "intrinsically intertwined with prior 
counsel for [Wade]." Transcript, p. 2 (See Exhibit J). 
Wade consented to the Judge's continued handling of the case 
under the assumption that the difficulties towards his attorneys 
did not extend to a bias against him personally. Apparently, 
however, this was not the case. At crucial points in the trial, 
the Judge made decisions which were not based upon the law, and 
which Wade can only assume were based upon a bias or prejudice 
against him. 
As will be discussed below, in one instance, the Judge 
allowed evidence of an oral contract or modification of the prior 
13 
contract to be admitted for the first time at trial. However, he 
refused to allow Wade's counsel to rebut the new issue with 
arguments based upon the statute of frauds and the statute of 
limitations, thus denying Wade the crucial opportunity to meet 
the new issue properly. This decision was not based upon the 
law. The law clearly provides that new issues can only be 
introduced when the opposing party is given a full opportunity to 
meet the issue. It is difficult to see any explanation for the 
exclusion of the rebuttal argument other than that the judge was 
predisposed against Wade based upon the prior difficulties he had 
with Wade's attorney's. 
Further, at one point in the case, evidence was submitted 
pertaining to a proceeding which Wade went through for fraud. 
The Judge apparently leaned heavily on this fact in his 
determination to discredit Wade's testimony. In his concluding 
statement, the Judge commented that he chose to discredit Wade's 
testimony based in large part upon the fact that Wade had gone 
through a fraud proceeding. Transcript, p. 125 (See Exhibit J). 
It appears that as a result of this introduction, the judge 
failed to decide the case based upon law, but rather, based it 
upon his bias towards Wade. The Judge's reaction to the evidence 
regarding Wade's fraud proceeding was clearly and unduly 
prejudicial. 
14 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT BASED ITS DECISION ON IMPROPER ISSUES AND 
UNALLOWABLE EVIDENCE 
The district court on remand erroneously determined that the 
allocation of property taxes was to be based upon the 
proportionate size of the parties1 parcels of land rather than 
upon the value of the parcels. This conclusion was based upon 
two alternative grounds. First, that there was an oral agreement 
which either amended the earlier written contract or created a 
subsequent contract to allocate taxes based upon acreage. 
Second, that letters and billing statements sent by Stangl to 
Wade reflecting Stangl's use of acreage to determine 
apportionment of taxes reflected the intent of the parties1 
written agreement that tax apportionment would be based on the 
area owned by each party. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, p. 4 (See Exhibit C). 
A. It was Prejudicial Error for the District Court to 
Allow Stangl to Raise the Issue of An "Oral Agreement" 
for the First Time at Trial Without Allowing Wade to 
Rebut the Argument on the Grounds of the Statute of 
Frauds and Statute of Limitations 
The first ground upon which the district court relied in 
finding that tax allocation should be based upon proportionate 
share of property was improper. The court found that an oral 
agreement had been reached by the parties which created an 
15 
"amendment to the contract" or a "subsequent contract" regarding 
the allocation of taxes. 
The argument that an oral contract or an amendment to the 
contract had been made regarding tax allocation had never been 
raised prior to the trial. Stangl had not advanced this claim in 
any pleading or prior court appearance. All of the discussions 
below had rested upon interpreting the written contract. Thus, 
Wade was not on notice of this claim and was prejudiced by the 
court's allowance of the issue. 
The introduction of a new claim is allowed if two conditions 
are met.8 The first requirement is that the parties implicitly 
or explicitly consent to its introduction.9 Consent can be 
implied by a party's failure to object to the introduction of 
evidence relevant to the issue. However, 
[a] party cannot be said to have implicitly consented 
to the trial of an issue not presented by the pleadings 
unless the party should have recognized that the issue 
had entered the case at trial. . . . The introduction 
of evidence arguably relevant to pleaded issues cannot 
serve to give a party fair notice that new issues are 
entering the case. 
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure form the basis for the introduction of new issues and state in part that "Cw]hen issues not raised 
by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects 
as if they had been raised in the pleadings." Utah R.Civ.P. 15(b). The relevant portion of Fed. R.Civ.P. 15 
(B) is identical. 
o 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah App. 1987); General Ins. Co. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 
545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976). 
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Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical Attractions of Palm Beach Inc., 833 
F.2d 1484, 1487 (CA11 Fla. 1987).10 Thus, if evidence relevant 
to the new issue is also relevant to one of the issues already in 
the case, consent cannot be implied. 
In this case, evidence of an alleged conversation between 
Stangl and Wade concerning tax apportionment was directly 
relevant to the previously raised issue of the intent of the 
parties under the contract. Thus, Wade had ,no reason to know 
that the new issue of an oral agreement forming the basis for a 
"new contractual agreement" or "amended contractual agreement" 
was being introduced. He reasonably believed that the evidence 
was being introduced for the sole purpose of showing intent. 
Thus, the first requirement for allowing a new issue was not met, 
there was no implicit or explicit consent. 
The second requirement for the introduction of a new issue 
at trial is that the non-introducing party be given a fair 
opportunity to present evidence material to the newly introduced 
issue. Specifically, the Colman court stated that the test is 
"whether the opposing party had a fair opportunity to defend and 
whether it could offer additional evidence if the case were 
retried on a different theory." Colman, 743 P.2d at 785, citing 
R. A. Pohl Constr. Co. v. Marshall, 640 F.2d 266, 267 (CA10 
10 
,u
 See also Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah App. 1987). 
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1981). The addition of such an issue "should not be permitted 
where it would operate to deny a party a fair opportunity to 
present evidence material to newly-added issues." Mineral Indus. 
& Heavy Constr. Group v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Com., 639 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1981).12 
In this case, Wade attempted to raise the issues of the 
application of the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of 
Limitations as they applied to the new issue, of an oral 
agreement. As shown in the following section, if these arguments 
had been permitted, they would have barred the admission of this 
new issue. However, the court found that the statute of frauds 
and statute of limitations arguments were waived because they had 
not been plead prior to trial. Transcript, p. 19, line 22-25 
(See Exhibit J). Therefore, the court did not allow Wade to 
rebut the new argument raised by Stangl pertaining to an oral 
contract or oral amendment to the prior contract. In violation 
of the requirements set forth above, Wade was not allowed the 
opportunity to present evidence crucial to defending against the 
new claims. 
See also Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436, 439 (CA10 Okla. 1979), cert, den. 
445 U.S. 964, 64 L.Ed.2d 239, 100 S.Ct. 1653 (1980); De Haas v. Empire Petro. Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1229 (CA10 
Colo. 1970); Simms v. Andrews, 118 F.2d 803, 807 (CA10 Okla. 1941). 
12
 le§ also International Harvester Credit Corp. v. East Coast Truck, 547 F.2d 888, 890 (CA5 1977). 
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1. The Alleged Oral Contract Between Stangl and Wade 
Violated the Statute of Frauds. 
If a new contract was created, or the existing contract was 
modified by the alleged oral agreement, this change was void 
under the Statute of Frauds. According to the Statute of Frauds, 
an agreement that extends further than one year or one to 
undertake the debts of another individual is void unless it is in 
writing and signed by the party who undertakes the 
responsibility.13 
In this case, Wade allegedly undertook to pay taxes based on 
the proportionate share of land he owned. Under this scenario 
Wade would be agreeing to pay for 71.34% of the taxes. Absent 
such an agreement (and absent Stanglfs refusal to segregate the 
two parcels for tax purposes) the taxing authorities would have 
applied an assessment based upon value which would have made Wade 
liable for only 56.66% of the total taxes for the parcel. (See 
Exhibit K). 
In sum, Wade allegedly undertook to pay a substantial 
percentage more of the taxes than he was obligated to pay. Thus, 
he assumed a debt which otherwise would have belonged to Stangl. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 25-5-4 Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. In the following 
cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: (1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed 
within one year from the making thereof. (2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of 
another. 
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Such an assumption of liability fits directly within the Statute 
of Frauds. 
In addition, this alleged assumption of liability 
purportedly resolved the tax conflict prospectively as the 
parties allegedly decided not to have the property segregated for 
future tax purposes. Thus, the alleged agreement would have 
covered more than a one year period of time, again placing it 
directly within the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 
Further, if this alleged oral agreement was not a new 
contract, but rather a modification of the old written contract, 
it was again void under the Statute of Frauds. If an original 
contract must satisfy the Statute of Frauds, then any subsequent 
agreements altering or modifying it must also be in writing and 
subscribed by the party to be bound. Combined Metals, Inc. v. 
Bastian, 267 P. 1020 (Utah 1928); Bamberger Co. v. Certified 
Prods., Inc.. 48 P.2d 489 (Utah 1936), adhered to 53 P.2d 1153 
(Utah 1935). 
An installment contract for the sale of land is 
unquestionably within the requirements of the statute of frauds, 
thus, a modification of that contract is also within the statute. 
For this alleged agreement to be enforceable, it must have been 
in writing and signed by Wade. No such evidence has been 
produced because there was no such agreement. 
20 
Because this alleged agreement was not in writing it 
violated the Statute of Frauds and was void. The parties were 
required to fall back upon the contract, which did not supply any 
guidance regarding taxes. Thus, as found by the Utah Supreme 
Court, the laws of equitable conversion applied, requiring the 
parties to pay those taxes which were directly attributable to 
their properties according to the value thereof. 
2. The Action Brought by Stangl Upon The Alleged Oral 
Agreement Was Barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
Under Utah law, "[a]n action upon a contract, obligation, or 
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing. . . . " must 
be brought within four years. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-15. 
Stangl alleges that Wade and he reached an oral agreement in 
1980 to apportion taxes based upon their proportionate share of 
land. The statute above applied directly to such an agreement. 
The alleged agreement would create an obligation on Wade's part 
to pay a portion of property taxes in excess of the amount he 
would be obligated to pay under applicable laws.14 
Any action upon this alleged contract, obligation or 
liability, could not be brought subsequent to the four years 
provided for by the statute of limitations. Thus, Stangl's claim 
that Wade had an obligation to pay taxes in excess of those 
14 
According to calculations made by Wade's attorney Paul Schwenke, based upon value Wade was liable 
for only 56.66% of the taxes. (See Exhibit K). 
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required by law, was untimely and barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
In sum, because the requirements for the admission of a new 
issue into a trial were not met in this case, and in fact, the 
statute of frauds and statute of limitations precluded the 
issue's admission, it was prejudicial for the court to rely upon 
those arguments in reaching a decision. Thus, the first ground 
upon which the court rested its determination that tax allocation 
should be based upon proportionate areas of land was improper. 
B. The District Court's Determination that the Parties 
Agreed to Allocate Taxes Based Upon the Proportionate 
Sizes of Their Parcels Was Clearly Erroneous As a 
Matter of Law. 
The trial court found that "it was the parties' intent at 
the time of execution of the written agreement and thereafter 
that the taxes should be apportioned based on the respective 
amount of land owned by each party." Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 4, #8 (See Exhibit C). This finding was 
the second ground for the district court's determination to 
apportion taxes on the basis of acreage and was clearly 
erroneous. 
The evidence upon which the district court relied in 
reaching the above conclusion consisted of letters and documents 
sent by Stangl to Wade. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
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p 4-5, #8-9, (See Exhibit C). According to 17A Am.Jur.2d § 523, 
although intent under a contract or the existence of a 
modification of a contract is normally a question for the trier 
of fact, the interpretation of documentary evidence passing 
between the parties is a question of law for the appellate court 
to review.15 Thus, this Court is not required to defer to the 
district court's findings based upon the letters and documents 
which passed between Stangl and Wade. 
The district court's finding that "it was the parties1 
intent at the time of execution of the written agreement and 
thereafter that the taxes should be apportioned based on the 
respective amount of land owned by each party,"16 is not 
supported by the evidence. The court itself stated in a prior 
finding that "[t]he parties intended and assumed that they would 
be separately taxed on their respective parcels following the 
year of the closing (1978)." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, p. 3, #6 (See Exhibit C). In fact, Stangl testified that 
the expectation of the parties pertaining to the taxes was "that 
the taxing authorities would bill each of us for our respective 
taxes, and we would each pay our respective taxes for our 
parcel." Transcript, p. 11, Lines 18-20 (See Exhibit J). Thus, 
15
 Hardy v. Ward. 150 N.C. 385, 64 S.E. 171 (1909). 
16 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 4, #8 (See Exhibit C). 
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the parties assumed that they would be taxed by the authorities, 
who, as a matter of law, tax individuals based upon the value of 
their property. 
To argue that the intent at the time the contract was 
written was that property taxes would be apportioned based upon 
the proportionate sizes of the property is ludicrous given the 
admission that the original intent was to be taxed separately 
based on value. 
The only grounds upon which an intent different than that 
established above could be shown, is if the contract, and thus 
the intent, were modified. However, as discussed above, because 
the contract was in writing, any modification would have to be in 
writing also. Further, in order for a contract to be modified, 
"the minds of the parties must have met upon an asserted contract 
modification." Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 
803, 806 (Utah 1979); Marnon v. Vauahan Motor Co., 194 P.2d 992 
(Or. 1948). 
In this case, the documents which the court relied upon in 
determining that the parties had intended the taxes to be 
allocated based upon acreage were prepared by Stangl. There was 
no indication in the documents that Wade agreed to this basis for 
taxation. "[A] party cannot by self-serving declarations make 
evidence for himself concerning his dealings with the other party 
24 
or the liability of such other party." National Importing & 
Trading Co. v. E. A. Bear & Co., 155 N.E. 343 (111. 1925); George 
J. Cooke Co. v. Fred Miller Brewing Co., 146 N.E. 459 (111. 
1925). 
Merely because Stangl wished to have the taxes allocated 
between himself and Wade based on acreage, and in fact prepared 
documents based upon these calculations rather than based on 
value, is not evidence that Wade agreed to such an allocation. 
According to 17A Am.Jur.2d, lf[t]he mental purpose of one of the 
parties to a contract cannot change its terms . . .17 One 
receiving an offer to change a contract to which he is a party is 
held to be under no obligation to answer it; and his silence 
cannot be construed as an acceptance . . .I|18 17A Am.Jur.2d 
§520, p. 537. Thus, the documents relied upon by the district 
court could not have established a mental intent to change the 
contract or enter a new contract. 
III. AS INSTRUCTED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT, THE ONLY 
APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF TAXES IN THIS CASE WAS UNDER THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION 
The Utah Supreme Court issued a Remittitur vacating a 
summary judgment ruling of the district court and remanding the 
17
 New York C. R. Co. v. Mohney, 252 U.S. 152, 64 L. Ed. 502, 40 S. Ct. 287 (1920); Southern Acid & 
Sulphur Co. v. Chi Ids, 184 S.w.2d 586 (Ark. 1945). 
18
 Suitter v. Thompson, 358 P.2d 267 (Or. 1960). 
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case (See Exhibit B). In its Remittitur, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated in part: 
The contract does not impose on the buyer any 
obligation to pay real property taxes except in the 
year 1978, and buyer is not therefore in default under 
the contract for non-payment of taxes. Appellant 
agrees that he is obligated to pay taxes actually 
accruing to his land, by reason of the doctrine of 
equitable conversion. However, the amount of taxes 
assessed since the year 1978 attributable to the parcel 
purchased and possessed by appellant is still in 
dispute. 
(See Exhibit B). 
The Utah Supreme Court determined that the contract in 
question did not provide for an ongoing obligation for real 
estate taxes. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged Wade's 
responsibility to pay taxes under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion. 
Pursuant to the doctrine of equitable conversion, the buyer, 
Wade, is liable for taxes directly attributable to the property 
he purchased. The Utah Supreme Court held that the amount of 
taxes actually attributable to Wade's property was a factual 
question still in dispute and remanded the case to the district 
court to determine that issue. Unfortunately, the district court 
did not decide this issue. 
Under the doctrine of equitable conversion 
the party who is in possession or entitled to 
possession at the time of accrual, is ordinarily bound 
to pay taxes accruing on the land after the making of 
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the contract and before a conveyance, unless there has 
been a delay in making the conveyance caused by the 
fault of the other party (seller). 
77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser § 326 (1975).19 
Thus, the buyer is responsible for paying the taxes which accrue 
on the land unless the seller causes a delay in making the 
conveyance. 
In this case, Wade concedes liability to pay taxes for the 
years 1982 through 1984 and only guestions what taxes are 
directly attributable to his property. However, pertaining to 
the years 1985 through 1990, Wade rests upon the second part of 
the doctrine of equitable conversion. As mentioned, when a 
seller causes a delay in making the conveyance, the buyer is not 
liable to pay taxes. This is not read as a strict transfer of 
tax liability to the seller, but rather is generally held to mean 
that the buyer is not liable to pay, until the seller performs by 
conveying the property. Annotations, Effect of Delay in Making 
Conveyance, 12 A.L.R. 416, 417 (1975) and cases cited therein. 
Stangl admits that Wade made all of his payments as required by 
the contract (See Exhibit G). Thus, when Wade made his final 
See also 12 A.L.R. 412, 414 (1921) citing Free v. Little. 88 P. 407 (Utah 1907). 
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payment on the contract in January of 1985, Stangl was 
concurrently obligated to convey the property to Wade.20 
Because Stangl did not convey the property to Wade, and 
still has not done so, Wade is not obligated to pay the taxes. 
Stangl caused "a delay in the conveyance" which excused Wade's 
payment of taxes subsequent to 1985. Stangl"s delay also 
resulted in the continuation of this controversy. If Stangl had 
performed and recorded a conveyance in January, 1985, Wade would 
have been assessed for his land separately and this controversy 
would have been limited to the taxes assessable to Wade's land in 
1979-1984. 
A. The Only Appropriate Method of Allocating Taxes Under 
the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion is Based Upon the 
Relative Value of Each Parties1 Property 
Taxation of property by the state must be based upon the 
value of the property. Any other means of allocating taxes 
imposes an unfair and unequal burden upon the individual.21 
Absent evidence that parties to a contract mutually agreed to 
base allocation of taxes upon some other basis, a court must 
See Johnson v. Jones, providing that "Cwlhere there is an agreement on the part of one to convey 
and on the part of another to pay a definite sum, payment and conveyance are concurrent acts. . ." Johnson, 
164 P.2d 893 (Utah 1946). See also 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendors and Purchasers, § 63 (1975). 
21 
In fact, certain states, such as Maine and Colorado, have enacted Constitutional provisions 
requiring allocation of property taxes based upon value as a result of these concerns. Maine Milk Producers, 
Inc. v. Commissioner of Agric. Food & Rural Resources, 483 A.2d 1213 (Me. 1984); United States Transmission 
Systems, Inc., v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 715 P.2d 1249 (Colo. 1986). 
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apply a value method of allocation. An individual has a right to 
be assessed taxes on the same basis as all other individuals and 
a court has no authority to violate that right. 
In this case, there is no evidence of a mutual agreement 
between Stangl and Wade to allocate taxes based upon some other 
method• Therefore the district court violated Wade's rights in 
allowing tax allocation on the basis of acreage as opposed to the 
value of the parties' parcels of land. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Wade respectfully requests this 
Court to order appellee Stangl to convey title of Wade's property 
to him pursuant to their written contract. Wade also requests an 
order from this Court remanding this case to the district court 
with instructions to determine the proper amount of taxes 
attributable to his property under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion. Further, Wade requests this Court to instruct the 
district court to determine said taxes based upon the value of 
the respective parties' property. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS jZOth day of N; 
James I . $?a£ts, 
er, 1992. 
1. Watts 
>rney for Appellant 
South 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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185 South State Street 
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1 6 5 S c x i t h W e s t T e ^ o ^ e *3C*0 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U tah 84101 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 801 ) 5 3 1 - 1 0 2 9 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
STANLEY L. WADE, I 
PI ainti-f-f , ) 
vs. ) 
F.C. STANGL III ] 
Defendant. ) 
> AFFIDAVIT OF STANLEY L. 
> WADE IN SUPPORT OF HIS 
i MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
1 JUDGMENT. 
> Case NQ.C87-357 
Honorable Michael Murphy 
I, Stanley L. Wade, after being first duly sworn, deposed 
and says: 
1. On or about May 16, 1978, I entered into a real estate 
contract with the Defendant, wherein the Defendant sold me a 
greater portion of a parcel of land that he owned. The Defendant 
retained a smaller frontage portion of the land with a building 
on it. I took the larger rear acreage. 
2. The Defendant was taxed for the larger parcel, and he 
in turn split the taxes based on the square footage, and charged 
me accordingly. This practice went on for approximately three 
years until the I discovered that I was paying substantially more 
than the taxes actually accrued to portion of the land that I 
bought. 
3. I protested by refusing to pay any more taxes until the 
amount of taxes that ar& actually accrued to my portion of the 
t 0f f54 
*-jk% t V ***** 
vm^T^*** 
4. I completed r*y performance unde*~ t*>^  cc^t^^ct \*> 
January, 1985, but the Defendant re-Fused to convey me the land. 
5. I hired my attorney in or about December, 1986, to 
enforce my rights under the contract. 
6. I have paid $9,750.86 toward the property taxes between 
1978 and 1981. 
7. I am paying attorney fees in connection with this case 
in the sum itemized in my attorney's affidavit in support of this 
motion for summary judgment. 
8. That I have also paid costs as itemized by my attorney 
in his affidavit in support of this motion for summary judgment. 
I respectfully submit this affidavit this day of March, 
1990. 4*4-
l'ey j£. Wc 
Stanl'ey L^. Wade 
Stanley L. Wade appeared personally before me and stated 
that he has personal knowledge of the facts stated herein. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day o-f March, 
1990. 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residing 
in Salt Lake County. 
My Commission expires: Commi-ss 
CCC5! 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage pre-
paid, a true and exact copy of the foregoing Affidavit to Steven 
G. Crocket, attorney for Defendant, at 185 South State Street, 
Suite 1300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this A, day o-f March, 
1990. 
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Exhibit B 
TH£ HUFRJSMK COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOOO 
Regular May Term, 1989 October 5, 1989 
Stanley L. Wade, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
F.C. Stangl, III, 
Defendant and Appellee< 
REMITTITUR 
No. 890256 
District No. C87-357 
Appellant's motion to reverse the judgment entered by 
the district court is hereby granted, and the appellee's motion to 
affirm the judgment is denied. 
The trial court was manifestly in error in granting 
summary judgment where material facts are in dispute. The contract 
does not impose on the buyer any obligation to pay real property taxes 
except in the year 1978, and buyer is not therefore in default under 
the contract for non-payment of taxes. Appellant agrees that he is 
obligated to pay taxes actually accruing to his land, by reason of the 
doctrine of equitable conversion. However, the amount of taxes 
assessed since the year 1978 attributable to the parcel purchased and 
possessed by appellant is still in dispute. 
The judgment is vacated, and this matter is remanded to 
the trial court for taking evidence and for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this order. 
Third Judicial District 
Issued: October 25, 1989 
Record: None
 / 
OCT 2 7 1989 0C33! 
Exhibit C 
w ... , .ctf l 
Thiid Juui „;ai Dbirict 
Stephen G. Crockett (A0766) 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER 
136 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Daniel A. Jensen (A5296) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Defendant 
OCT 3 1 1991 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY L. WADE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
F. C. STANGL III, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C-87-357 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
This matter came on regularly for a bench trial before the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge, on the 4th day of 
October, 1991. Plaintiff Stanley L. Wade was present and was 
represented by his counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson. Defendant 
F.C. Stangl III was present and was represented by his counsel of 
record, Stephen G. Crockett and Daniel A. Jensen. The Court having 
reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having received sworn 
testimony, exhibits and other evidence at trial, and being fully 
advised in the premises, hereby makes and enters the following: 
STGL\082.vc 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both plaintiff (hereafter "Wade") and defendant 
(hereafter "Stangl") are residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. The 
contract or contracts involved in this dispute were entered into 
by the parties in Salt Lake County, Utah. The real estate which 
was the subject of this dispute is located within Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
2. Pursuant to a written installment land contract dated May 
16, 1978, Wade agreed to buy, and Stangl agreed to sell, 6.87 acres 
of real property for the price of $206,100. The balance of the 
purchase price was payable to Stangl in 79 equal monthly 
installments. While the contract references an attached Exhibit 
A describing the property purchased by Wade, no such exhibit was 
ever attached to the contract. 
3. The property sold (hereafter "Wade's Property") consisted 
of a parcel of land located at approximately 9200 South, 700 East, 
Sandy City, Utah. The 6.87 acres comprising Wade's Property were 
part of a larger tract of land owned by Stangl containing 9.63 
acres. Stangl retained ownership of the remaining 2.76 acres. As 
depicted on the County Recorder's plat attached hereto as Exhibit 
A, Wade's Property is generally situated behind Stangl's retained 
property with respect to 700 East Street, and is accessed by a 50-
foot wide strip of land which also serves as a non-exclusive right-
of-way for access to Stangl's property. Wade's Property, which 
STGL\082.vc 
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includes the underlying fee to the right-of-way tract and totals 
6,87 acres, is described more particularly in Exhibit B hereto. 
4. Pursuant to the written 1978 contract, Wade eventually 
paid Stangl the agreed-upon purchase price of $206,100. 
5. Paragraph 6 of the 1978 written contract provides that 
11
 [r]eal property taxes for the year 1978 shall be prorated at the 
closing." The parties did in fact prorate the 1978 taxes based on 
(1) the number of days of the year each party owned the property, 
and (2) the area (square footage) owned by each party as compared 
to the total area of the 9.63-acre consolidated tract. 
6. The parties intended and assumed that they would be 
separately taxed on their respective parcels following the year of 
the closing (1978) . The county taxing authorities, however, 
continued to assess and tax Stangl for the entire 9.63-acre 
consolidated tract and did not individually tax the parties1 
separate parcels because no conveyance of Wade's Property had taken 
place, nor was any conveyance yet required under the terms of the 
installment land contract (which had a 6%-year executory period). 
6. During the years 1979, 1980 and 1981, the parties 
continued their practice of apportioning the property taxes based 
on the square footage or acreage owned by each party as compared 
to the total amount of land within the consolidated tract. 
Beginning with the year 1982, Wade failed and refused to pay any 
amount for taxes on the subject property and has at all times since 
STGL\082.vc 
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failed and refused to pay any amount toward the appurtenant 
property taxes. 
7. In 1980, the parties orally agreed to split the tax 
liability for the consolidated tract according to the proportionate 
amount of land owned by each party. This oral agreement 
prospectively resolved the issue of tax liability allocation 
between the parties. The primary reason for the parties1 oral 
agreement was that doing so would result in lower taxes for each 
party than would be the case if the two parcels were segregated and 
separately assessed and taxed. This 1980 oral agreement was either 
a separate and subsequent agreement by the parties concerning 
property tax allocation, or was an oral clarification or 
modification of the 1978 written contract which was ambiguous in 
that it addressed only the taxes for 1978 (the first year of a 6%-
year executory contract). The oral agreement also reflected the 
prior conduct of the parties from and after 1978 with respect to 
property tax apportionment. 
8. The letters and other documents contained in Exhibit P 
of the parties' Stipulation were sent and received by Wade or 
someone on Wade's behalf. Even if there was no subsequent oral 
agreement concerning tax apportionment, the documents in Exhibit 
P of the Stipulation reflect the parties' intent at the time of 
execution of the written agreement and thereafter that the taxes 
should be apportioned based on the respective amount of land owned 
by each party. 
STGL\082.vc 
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9. Therefore, either (1) the 1980 oral agreement was an 
amendment to the earlier written contract or was a subsequent 
contract which in either case prospectively resolved the issue of 
property tax apportionment (which oral agreement was not subject 
to the Statute of Frauds because it involved no transfer of an 
interest in land but only effected a resolution of property tax 
responsibility), or (2) the documents contained in Exhibit P of the 
parties1 Stipulation reflect the intent of the parties1 written 
agreement that tax apportionment would be based on the area owned 
by each party, and such evidence of intent is important and 
determinative in resolving the ambiguity concerning future tax 
apportionment in the written contract. Under either of these 
alternative findings, the parties conclusively agreed that the 
property taxes would be allocated according to the amount of land 
owned by each party. The Court did not rely on evidence submitted 
by Stangl that the taxes did in fact increase for each party when 
the parties' parcels were finally segregated and separately 
assessed in 1991. 
10. Until the 1991 tax year, the consolidated 9.63-acre tract 
of land was never separately assessed to establish individual taxes 
for Wade's 6.87 acres and Stangl's retained 2.76 acres. Instead, 
Stangl has been taxed each year for the consolidated property as 
a single, undivided parcel. In order to avoid loss of the property 
through a tax sale, Stangl has paid the property taxes assessed 
against the entire consolidated tract each year since 1978 except 
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for the years 1990 and 1991, which taxes have not yet been paid. 
Stangl has agreed and is responsible to pay the full amount of said 
1990 taxes on the consolidated property provided that Wade first 
satisfies in full the judgment entered by this Court, which 
judgment includes apportionment of the 1990 taxes. Beginning with 
the 1991 tax year, the two parcels will be separately taxed and the 
parties will be individually responsible for payment of the taxes 
assessed against their respective parcels for each year from and 
after 1991. 
11. Stangl has been paid in full by Wade for Wade's 
proportionate share of the 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 taxes. Wade 
is, however, liable to Stangl for Wade's proportionate share of the 
taxes for 1982 through 1990, together with prejudgment interest 
thereon at the legal rate. The amount of said 1982-1990 taxes and 
interest was stipulated by the parties to be $74,652, as indicated 
in Exhibit C hereto. Exhibit C accurately sets forth the 
apportioned property taxes for the tax years 1982 through 1990 
based on the acreage owned by each party and the equal division of 
acreage beneath the right-of-way. For the 1991 tax year, the two 
parcels will for the first time be taxed separately. Therefore, 
no apportioned amount is included in Exhibit C for the year 1991. 
Exhibit C also accurately sets forth the prejudgment interest on 
Wade's proportionate share of the taxes in accordance with Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2). As reflected by Exhibit C, the total amount 
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of taxes and prejudgment interest owed by Wade to Stangl is 
$74,652. 
12. In August of 1989, Stangl engaged Strategis Asset 
Valuation and Management Company to appeal the amount of taxes 
assessed to the consolidated property for 1989. Strategis 
succeeded in lowering the 1989 taxes from $27,029.80 to $11,752.02, 
a savings of $15,277.78 to both parties. Strategis1 fee for such 
action was 33.3% of the reduction amount of $15,277.78, or 
$5,087.50. This amount is properly considered a tax-related 
expense inuring to the benefit of both parties and was therefore 
properly added to the tax amount for 1989 to be apportioned between 
the parties along with the tax for that year as shown in Exhibit C. 
13. It is appropriate that acreage apportionment of the 
property taxes extend beyond the time when Wade completed his 
installment payments and continue until the time the parties' 
parcels were severed and separately assessed and taxed (i.e., 
through the 1990 tax year) because of: (1) Wade's failure, despite 
an appropriate discovery request, to produce or identify relevant 
documents that he claimed to have drafted; (2) Wade's failure to 
communicate in a reasonable and timely manner with his attorney or 
attorneys (or with opposing counsel and/or this Court if Wade had 
no attorney); and (3) Wade's overall failure to involve himself in 
the lawsuit he initiated. 
14. The Court generally credited Stangl's testimony and 
discredited Wade's testimony because of, inter alia, Wade's 
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admitted fraudulent activities that took place contemporaneously 
with this lawsuit. Wade's insistence that he at all times relied 
entirely on Stangl in connection with all relevant issues is 
indicative to the Court of fraudulent conduct and of an attempt by 
Wade to alter or withhold the truth. 
15. The Counterclaim against Wade, filed December 21, 1988, 
has never been answered. Technically, therefore, Wade is in 
default. The Counterclaim seeks dismissal of Wade's Complaint with 
prejudice, reimbursement of Wade's share of the property taxes and 
interest thereon at the legal rate, and attorneys fees and costs. 
Stangl is entitled to such relief. 
16. Paragraph 15 of the parties' 1978 written agreement 
provides that, in the event of a default under the agreement, the 
prevailing party shall recover from the losing party reasonable 
attorneys fees and costs. There is no requirement in the agreement 
for notice of said default in order for the right to attorneys fees 
to attach. Even if notice of default was required to receive 
attorneys fees, trial Exhibit CC reflects that Wade was given 
notice of his default. Because Wade failed thereafter to pay his 
share of the property taxes, said default was never cured. 
Stangl's 1988 Counterclaim, of which the Court takes judicial 
notice, is further notice to Wade of his default under the 
contract. Furthermore, at the beginning of the trial the parties 
stipulated that their dispute focused on said written agreement and 
that the prevailing party is entitled to attorneys fees. Stangl 
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is the prevailing party and is therefore entitled to reasonable 
attorneys fees and costs, evidence of which is to be submitted to 
the Court by affidavit in accordance with Rule 4-505 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration. 
17. F.C. Stangl Construction Company check No. 55499, payable 
to Stanley L. Wade in the amount of $52,776.00, was hand-delivered 
to A. Paul Schwenke, the attorney of record and the attorney in 
actuality for Wade, on behalf of and as agent for Wade. A 
withdrawal of counsel A. Paul Schwenke, purportedly executed on 
March 7, 1989, was never filed with the Court and was not served 
on opposing counsel despite a certificate of service to the 
contrary. Even if the withdrawal had been filed, Mr. Schwenke 
continued to represent Wade by, for example, prosecuting a 
successful Motion for Summary Disposition with the Utah Supreme 
Court in July 1989 and by filing a Certificate of Readiness for 
Trial with this Court on May 24, 1990. The Court takes judicial 
notice of the fact that Mr. Schwenke continued to file numerous 
pleadings on Wade's behalf, the first one (a notice to submit for 
decision) dated only six days after the purported withdrawal of 
counsel. The only withdrawal of counsel by Mr. Schwenke was filed 
with the Court on January 9, 1991. Wade's sworn affidavit, 
acknowledged on March 25, 1990 (trial Exhibit Y) , expressly 
references an accompanying affidavit prepared by Wade's attorney, 
Mr. Schwenke. Mr. Schwenke's affidavit itemizes costs and services 
rendered on Wade's behalf over a period exceeding one year 
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following Schwenke's purported withdrawal from the case on March 
7, 1989. Wade's affidavit convinces the Court that Wade was aware 
of Mr. Schwenke's ongoing representation. In light of the above, 
the unfiled withdrawal of counsel does not constitute a withdrawal 
from the case by Mr. Schwenke. The agency relationship between 
Wade and Schwenke therefore continued to abide until January 9# 
1991, when Schwenke formally withdraw as counsel. 
18. Alternatively, even if Mr. Schwenke did inform Wade that 
he was withdrawing as counsel, Wade failed to adhere to his 
obligation to timely communicate the withdrawal to this Court 
and/or to opposing counsel. Instead, Wade knowingly neglected this 
action from the date of Schwenke's purported withdrawal in March 
1989 until Wade engaged his present counsel in February 1991. 
Wade's complete failure to attend in any way to a pending 
proceeding justifies and excuses any and all good faith actions 
taken by opposing counsel during Wade's neglect of this matter. 
19. Accordingly, A. Paul Schwenke was, at the time said check 
was tendered to him, Wade's agent in law and in fact, by actuality 
and by appearance. The subsequent alteration of the check is 
deemed to be the act of Wade, and Wade is not entitled to any 
offset or credit with respect to said check or with respect to the 
funds represented by said check. Stangl is deemed to have repaid 
in full the sum he was obligated to repay to Wade by virtue of this 
Court's Order of November 21, 1989. 
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20. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment to be entered by 
the Court against Wade, Stangl is to convey to Wade the property 
described in Exhibit B, subject to the non-exclusive right-of-way 
described above, in accordance with the terms of the parties1 
written agreement. 
21. The Court wishes to note that Bruce J. Nelson, Wade's 
present counsel, was not associated in any way with Wade's prior 
counsel and had no involvement whatsoever with the fraudulent and 
unethical activities alleged by Wade to have taken place earlier 
in the course of this dispute. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has proper jurisdiction over the parties and 
the subject matter hereof. 
2. Stangl is entitled to a judgment from Wade, which 
judgment should be entered in accordance with the Findings and 
Conclusions herein. 
3. As explained in the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
property taxes attributable to the consolidated tract of land 
containing the parties' respective parcels should properly be 
allocated between the parties according to the proportionate amount 
of area owned by each party, as set forth in Exhibit C. 
4. Because of Wade's breach of the parties' written and/or 
oral agreement or agreements, Wade is liable to Stangl for Wade's 
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proportionate share of the property taxes for the years 1982 
through 1990, together with prejudgment interest thereon at the 
legal rate, which sums amount to a total of $74#652.00. Stangl is, 
therefore, pursuant to his Counterclaim filed on December 21, 1988, 
entitled to a judgment in his favor of $74,652.00, plus post-
judgment interest at the legal rate, plus whatever amount of 
attorneys fees and costs the Court deems appropriate upon 
submission of evidence of same. Additionally, Wade's Complaint 
should be dismissed with prejudice. 
5. As the prevailing party, Stangl is entitled to reasonable 
attorneys fees and costs, evidence of which is to be submitted to 
the Court by affidavit in accordance with Rule 4-505 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration. 
6. At the time Stangl's check No. 55499 in the amount of 
$52,776.00 was tendered to A. Paul Schwenke, Mr. Schwenke was 
Wade's agent in law and in fact, by actuality and by appearance. 
The subsequent alteration of the check is deemed to be the act of 
Wade, and Wade is not entitled to any offset or credit with respect 
to said check or with respect to the funds represented by said 
check. Stangl is deemed to have repaid in full the sum he was 
obligated to repay to Wade by virtue of this Court's Order of 
November 21, 1989. 
7. Stangl is responsible to pay the full amount of the 1990 
taxes on the consolidated property, provided that Wade first 
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satisfies in full the judgment to be entered by this Court, which 
judgment will include apportionment of the 1990 taxes. 
8. Beginning with the 1991 tax year, the parties7 properties 
will be separately taxed and the parties will be individually 
responsible for payment of the taxes assessed against their 
respective parcels for each year from and after 1991. 
9. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment to be entered by 
the Court against Wade, Stangl shall be obligated to convey to Wade 
the property described in Exhibit B, subject to the non-exclusive 
right-of-way described in said Exhibit. 
MADE AND ENTERED this 3/'" day of (DrTs\(~tA . , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
Awlw^ K 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPH) 
District Judge, State of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on thirfs* jHUday of October, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand-delivered to: 
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
215 South State, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Exhibit D 
Stephen G. Crockett (A0766) 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER 
136 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Daniel A. Jensen (A5296) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Tfih'ci JIJI:..^! District 
NOV 1 1991 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH a^iyifl 
STANLEY L. WADE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
F. C. STANGL III, 
Defendant. 
IhS^l-^lct^. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-87-357 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
This matter came on regularly for a bench trial before the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge, on the 4th day of 
October, 1991. Plaintiff Stanley L. Wade was present and was 
represented by his counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson. Defendant 
F.C. Stangl III was present and was represented by his counsel of 
record, Stephen G. Crockett and Daniel A. Jensen. The Court having 
reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having received sworn 
testimony, exhibits and other evidence at trial, having heard 
arguments of counsel, having entered its Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law, having received appropriate affidavits in 
support of attorneys' fees, and being fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Defendant is entitled to judgment against plaintiff in 
accordance with the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. The amount of said judgment is as follows: 
Plaintiff's proportionate share of property 
taxes for 1982-1990 $54,835 
Pre-judgment interest thereon at the legal 
rate $19,817 
Attorneys' fees and costs %VLL^L1I *t ° " 
TOTAL tftttfl. f 0 P^M 
Defendant is also entitled to post-judgment interest at the legal 
rate and costs incurred in satisfaction of said judgment. 
3. Upon full satisfaction of this judgment by plaintiff, 
defendant shall (1) pay the full amount of the 1990 taxes on the 
parties' consolidated property, and (2) convey to plaintiff the 
property described in Exhibit B to the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, subject to the non-exclusive right-of-way 
described in said Exhibit. 
4. Beginning with the 1991 tax year, the parties shall be 
individually responsible for payment of the property taxes 
separately assessed against their respective parcels of land. 
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\ /*\ 
DATED this \*b day of / ^ ^ H ^ t ^
 1991> 
BY THE COURT: 
~Ku^ X . '/> 
. R. MURPHY / HONORABLE MICHAEL R. ~T 
District Judge, State of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this .Jl^^^day of October, 1991, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT was hand-
delivered to: 
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
215 South State, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
'toa^ia-^J 
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Exhibit E 
Stephen G. Crockett (A0766) 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER 
136 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Daniel A. Jensen (A5296) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Defendant 
ssPH'tt 
I R I C T 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY L. WADE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
F. C. STANGL III, 
Defendant. 
>iH^7? 
PARTIAL SATISFACTION OF 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C87-357 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
F. C. STANGL III, defendant in the above-captioned matter, 
hereby gives notice through his counsel of record: 
1. That on November 1, 1991, the Court entered judgment in 
his favor and against plaintiff Stanley L. Wade in the amount of 
$100,699.90, which judgment was docketed on November 5, 1991. 
2. That on June 11, 1992, defendant collected $86,843.97 
from plaintiff in partial satisfaction of said judgment. 
3. That on June 11, 1992, plaintiff owed defendant $7,217.29 
in post-judgment interest at the legal rate of 12% pursuant to Utah 
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Code Ann. § 15-1-4, together with the full principal amount of the 
$100,699.90 judgment. 
4. That after deducting plaintiff's payment of $86,843.97 
from the total amount owing as of June 11, 1992, plaintiff still 
owed defendant $21,073.22 pursuant to said judgment plus post-
judgment interest at the legal rate of 12% from and after June 11, 
1992. 
5. That on July 1, 1992, defendant collected an additional 
$19,543.00 from plaintiff in partial satisfaction of said judgment. 
6. That on July 1, 1992, plaintiff owed defendant $138.56 in 
post-judgment interest at the legal rate of 12% pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-4, together with the remaining judgment amount of 
$21,073.22. 
7. That after deducting plaintiff's payment of $19,543.00 
from the total amount owing as of July 1, 1992, plaintiff still 
owes defendant $1,668.78 pursuant to said judgment plus post-
judgment interest at the legal rate of 12% from and after July 1, 
1992. 
8. That plaintiff has partially satisfied the interest-
accruing judgment against him to the extent of $106,386.97, but as 
of July 1, 1992, still owes defendant $1,668.78 pursuant to said 
judgment. 
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DATED this JP day of July, 1992. 
KIMBALL, PARR. WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
DanTelA^-tjensen 
Attorneys forUDefendant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this & 
day of July, 1992, by DANIEL A. JENSEN. 
' ^ 
H 
Notary Publ i c <i 
185 So. State St #1300 I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 . 
September 20,19^3 \ 
State of Utah 
My commission expires: 
NOTARY/PUBLIC, residing' in 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this (£_ day of July, 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing PARTIAL SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Stanley L. Wade 
2159 East Parley's Terrace 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
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Exhibit F 
A G R E E M E N T 
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into this /£1— day of 
//(A*i t 1978, by and between STANLEY WADE, hereinafter referred 
e /*1 to as'"Buyer," and F. C. STANGL III, hereinafter referred to as 
"Seller," with reference to the following facts: 
A. Seller is the owner of a certain tract of real property 
located in Sandy City, Salt Lake County, Utah, which property is more 
particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference as Parcels 1 and 2. Parcel 2 of the land 
as described above and on Exhibit "A" hereto is sometimes referred 
to herein as the "Property"'. 
B. Seller desires to sell the Property to Buyer and Buyer 
desires to purchase the Property from Seller oh the terms herein set 
forth. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants 
and promises herein set forth, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Purchase Price; Paynent. The total purchase price 
for the Property shall be $206,100. The purchase price will be paid to-
Seller in the following manner: 
1.1 Buyer has heretofore paid $1,000 to Seller as 
earnest money, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged. 
1.2 The additional sum of $49,000 shall be paid by 
Buyer to Seller at the time of closing, which closing 
shall be on or before May f/j>, 1978. 
1.3 The balance of $156,100, together with interest 
on the unpaid balance frorr. and after closing, at the rate 
of 8-1/2% per ann\m, shall be- paid aa fcllov:s: 
Seventy-nine (79) equal monthly installments 
of principal and interest in the amount of $2,586,91 
each, with the firstt payment being due and payable 
on Juiy 1, ±97b, wirn interest from the t-lo»xug 
date to June 1, 1978, to be paid by Seller at the 
closing. No prepayment shall be allowed vithouQQftQl 
Seller's express written consent. 
2. Encumbrances. It is understood and agreed that after 
closing there will exist against the Property and Parcel 1 a Trust 
Deed securing a Note in favor of Ralph K. Tolman and Betty R. Tolman 
(hereinafter referred to as the underlying obligation) copies of 
which are attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by 
reference and those easements and restrictions, as listed on Exhibit 
*C" Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Upon 
closing Buyer will accept the Property subject to the underlying obli-
gation and to those easements and restrictions. Seller will, however, 
so long as Buyer is current on his obligations hereunder, make all 
payments due on the underlying obligation. 
3. Substitution of Security. Should Buyer desire to 
develop the Property and thus need fee title thereto unencumbered by 
the underlying obligation'prior to the time that the underlying oblige 
is paid in full by Seller, Seller will, at Buyer's request, exercise 
its rights to substitute security as provided in the Trust Deed secur-
ing the underlying obligation. Buyer shall provide a portion of the 
substituted security equal to the then unpaid balance hereunder. .Tha 
security shall be deemed substituted security for the purposes of thi 
agreement also and upon receipt of Buyer's substituted security and a 
release of the underlying obligation Seller will deed the property to 
Buyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Buyer shall not prepay this 
agreement, but shall continue to pay according to the terms hereof 
(which payment shall be secured by the substituted security), unless 
Seller consents to a prepayment. 
Should Seller desire to obtain a release of the Parcel 
1 property (even though Buyer might not yet want a release of Farcel 
2), Buyer will then be required to put up his share of the substitut 
security as hereinabove set forth and will at that tine receive a 
deed to the Property free and clear of the underlying encumbrances. 
Buyer shall# nevertheless, continue to make the payments reguired 
her -m-\P~- A — * *1 --^ ri? *n f""» I according to the terras hereof (which 
payment shall be secured by the substituted security) unless Seller 
shall consent to a prepayment. 
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4. Title. At closing Seller shall provide to Buyer a 
preliminary title report in the form of Exhibit WDM attached hereto, 
showing title to be in accordance with this Agreement. Seller agrees 
that upon recordation of the Warranty Deed delivered pursuant to this 
Agreement, title will vest in Buyer subject only to those matters 
and things allowed by this Agreement or approved by Buyer's attorney. 
5. Conveyance. The conveyance of the Property to Buyer 
pursuant to this Agreement shall be by Warranty Deed subject only to 
the matters and things allowed by this Agreement. 
^* Taxes. Real property taxes for the year 1978 shall be 
prorated at the closing. 
7. Possession - Closing Date. 
7.1 Buyer shall enter into possession of the Property 
immediately after the closing. The closing shall be on 
or before Kay //,? , 197 8, and shall be at a mutually 
convenient location. 
7.2 At the closing, Buyer shall deliver to Seller 
the sum due under subparagraph 1.2 of this Agreement, 
plus such other sums as may be required to pay any closing 
charges and prorations, attributable to Buyer. 
7.3 As of the close of business on the day prior to 
closing, the parties shall prorate all taxes and assess-
ments relating to the Property in accordance with the 
latest tax and assessments bills. 
7.4 The closing shall be completed by the parties 
delivering to each other a statement listing all credits 
and debits to each party for prorations and closing 
fees required under this Agreement. This statement shall 
be conclusively presumed to be correct unless a party 
protests such statements at the time of the closing. The 
closing shall be completed by the Buyer delivering to 
th~ Qo*-1— *-*-- —*C5 required i{y subDaranraph 1.2 hereof, 
plus or minus prorations. Upon the accomplishment of 
the foregoing, the closing shall be deemed complete and 
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Buyer will be entitled to enter into possession of the v ^ o 
Property. 
8
* Default. If Buyer fails, neglects, or otherwise 
refuses to make any of the payments herein agreed to be made when due, 
a default shall occur, and if Buyer fails to cure said default within 
ten (10) days after written notice as herein required, Seller shall have 
the remedies set forth hereafter in this paragraph. If Buyer defaults 
in any other material term or condition of this Agreement, and such 
default continues for a period of twenty (20) days, Seller may notify 
Buyer in writing of such default and of Seller's election to exercise 
his rights hereunder by notice as herein required. If Buyer has not 
cured such default within the times above specified. Seller, at his 
option, and without further notice, shall have the remedies set forth 
hereinafter in this paragraph. 
8.1 Seller shall have the right to be released from 
all obligations in law and in equity to convey any 
unconveyed property, and all payments which have been 
made theretofore by the Buyer shall be forfeited to the 
Seller as liquidated damages for the non-performance of 
the Agreement and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may 
at his option re-enter and take possession of the un-
conveyed property without legal processes as in its firs* 
and former estate, and Buyer becoming at once a tenant 
at will of the Seller. 
8.2 Seller may bring suit on this contract and re-
cover judgment for all unpaid principal and accrued 
interest, together with costs and attorney's fees. The 
use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not 
prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting to a 
different remedy at a later date. 
8.3 The Seller shall have the right, at his option, 
and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the 
entire unpa^u L w — — h ur." * ->r" du* and payable, 
and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mort-
gage, and pass title to the Buyer subject thereto, and 
soici «nc3 the proceeds applied to the payment, ^f the balance 
owingr including costs and attorney's fees, and Seller may 
have a judgment against Buyer for any deficiency which 
may remain. In the case of foreclosure, the Seller here-
under, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately 
entitled to the appointment of a receiver to take posses-
sion of the Property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the 
obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant to order 
of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of 
foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession of the 
said premises during the period of redemption. 
8.4 After a substitution of security and deeding of the 
Property as provided in paragraph 2 above. Seller's remedies 
shall be against the substituted security as provided in the 
letter of credit accepted as substituted security and shall 
not be against the Property. 
9. Brokerage Indemnity. Bach party hereto hereby agrees 
that he will indemnify, defend and hold the other party hereto and his 
employees harmless from and against and in respect of any claims of 
brokerage and other commissions relative to this Agreement or the trans-
actions contemplated hereby or any of the documents to be executed pur-
suant hereto, which claims are based in any way on agreements made by or 
behalf of the indemnifying party with any other party Or parties whatsoev 
10. Binding on Heirs and Assigns. This Agreement is and 
shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto 
and their respective heirs, successors and assigns. 
11. Compliance with Applicable Lavs. Buyer agrees that, 
at all times prior to the deeding of the Property to Buyer, he will 
comply with all federal, state and local laws, regulations, rules and 
orders applicable to the Property or activities or operations thereon 
or in connection therewith. 
12. Title Insurance. At the time the Property is deeded 
to Buyer p*:rsu*nt to the L-rr *>e »*. e*T*— '•'--oi *"»,>{ch to Buyer a 
standard owner's policy of title insurance insuring title to be as set 
forth in paragraph 4 above. 0Q395 
13. Survey - Acreage. This Agreement is mad<3 based upon 
sold and purchased contains 6.87 net useable acres, in Sandy City. Shoul 
the Property, on survey, contain more or less than 6.87 net useable 
acres, the purchase price will be adjusted up or down based on a per 
acre price of $30,000. 
14. Entire Agreement. It is expressly understood by the 
parties hereto that there are no representations, covenants or agree-
ments between the parties with reference to the Property or the 
transaction contemplated hereby except as herein specifically set 
forth or attached hereto. 
15. Attorney's Fees. In the event there is a default 
under this Agreement and it becomes reasonably necessary for either 
party to employ the services of an attorney, either to enforce or 
terminate this Agreement, with or without litigation,, the losing party 
to the controversy arising out of the default shall pay to the 
successful party a reasonable attorney's fee and, in addition, such 
costs and expenses as are incurred in enforcing or in terminating 
this Agreement. 
16. Notices. Except as otherwise specifically provided, 
all notices, demands and other communications hereunder shall be in 
writing and shall be deemed to have been duly given and delivered if 
mailed by United States certified and registered mail, postage prepiad, 
to the parties or their assignees at the following addresses or such 
other addresses as are given in writing from one party to the other: 
Buyer: Stanley Kace 
-sue <Lo*w *H<cj 
Seller: F. C. Stangl III 
c/o Denis R. Morrill, Esq. 
4 55 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN WITNESS lTHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreer.er.t 
on the day and year first above written. 
SELLER 
00396 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On t h i s M~i<i^ day of 
^ 
1978, personally 
appeared before me F. C. Stangl III, a signer of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to ir.e that he executed the same. 
My Commission expires: 
Kofi 
Res w£y&&~*p, «*<•' 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this /{/~f& day of _, 1978, personally 
appeared before me Stanley Wade, a signer of the foregoing instrument, 
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
— - j ' s -
, TMzUl 
My Commission e x p i r e s : 
00397 
Exhibit G 
Stephen G. Crockett (A0766) 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER 
13 6 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Daniel A. Jensen (A5296) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY L. WADE, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
F. C. STANGL III, 
Defendant. ] 
> STIPULATION 
i Civil No. C-87-357 | Judge Michael R. Murphy 
In connection with the pending trial of the above-referenced 
matter, plaintiff Stanley Wade ("Wade") and defendant F.C. Stangl 
III ("Stangl"), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby 
stipulate and agree as follows: 
1. Pursuant to a written installment land contract dated May 
16, 1978, Wade agreed to buy, and Stangl agreed to sell, certain 
real property for the price of $206,100. A true and exact copy of 
said contract is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
%w» 
0:T i 4 s W ^ 
:TRICT 
r.'i'i 
L-- - '!#*£ 
STGL\080.vc 00690 
of all mathematical calculations in this Stipulation that are based 
on such acreages. 
4. As evidenced by the County Recorder's plat attached as 
Exhibit E, the Subject Property (i.e., Wade's property) is 
accessible from 700 East Street by a 50-foot wide non-exclusive 
right-of-way located along the northern boundary of Stangl's 
retained property. The parties agree that, if acreage-based 
apportionment of the taxes is found by the Court to be appropriate, 
the acreage beneath the right-of-way (amounting to 0.55 acres for 
a parcel measuring 50 feet by 476.14 feet) should be evenly divided 
between the two parties. 
5. Pursuant to the 1978 installment land contract (Exhibit 
A), Wade paid Stangl $50,000 at closing and, eventually, the 
balance of $156,100 plus 8%% interest, which balance was payable 
in 79 equal monthly installments of $2,586.99. 
6. Until the 1991 tax year, the consolidated 9.63-acre tract 
of land containing the Subject Property has never been separately 
assessed to establish individual taxes for Wade's 6.87 acres and 
Stangl's 2.76 acres. Instead, Stangl has been taxed each year for 
the consolidated property as a single, undivided parcel. Beginning 
with the 1991 tax year, the two parcels will be separately taxed. 
7. Exhibits F through N are true and correct copies of the 
annual Tax Notices received by Stangl from the Salt Lake County 
Treasurer for the consolidated property for the tax years 1982 
through 1990, respectively. 
STGL\080.vc 
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11. As evidenced by the documents attached as Exhibit 0, 
Stangl has paid the property taxes assessed against the entire 
consolidated tract each year since 1978 except for the year 1990, 
which taxes have not yet been paid. Stangl hereby agrees to pay 
the full amount of said 1990 taxes on the consolidated property in 
the event that the Court awards Stangl a judgment based on acreage 
apportionment which includes the 1990 taxes. 
12. As evidenced by the documents attached as Exhibit P, Wade 
reimbursed Stangl for a portion of the property taxes for the years 
1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 as set forth below: 
Amount Paid 
Tax Year by Wade Date Paid 
1978 $1,410.34 12/26/78 
1979 $2,381.04 05/13/81 
1980 $2,654.13 01/04/82 
1981 $3,304.73 01/07/82 
As also evidenced by the documents attached as Exhibit P, the 
amounts paid by Wade during the above-listed years were based on 
the acreage or square footage of the land owned by Wade as compared 
to the total amount of land within the consolidated tract. 
13. Recognizing that the parties disagree as to the 
appropriateness of apportioning the property taxes based on the 
percentage of acreage owned by each party, the parties agree that 
if acreage-based apportionment is found by the Court to be 
appropriate, Exhibit Q accurately sets forth under the heading of 
"Tax Assessed" the yearly amounts properly subject to apportionment 
between the parties, as determined from the county's Tax Notices 
STGL\080.wc 
-5-
nftftQii 
tor the years 1982 through 1990 (Exhibits F through N) modified as 
follows: 
(a) In 1984, Stangl persuaded Salt Lake County to reduce 
the property tax assessment on the jointly-owned property by 
$538.54 for the 1982 tax year and by $746.13 for the 1983 tax year. 
These amounts have been deducted from the amounts appearing on the 
corresponding annual Tax Notices. 
(b) A small portion of the taxes for the years 1982 
through 1986 corresponded to a moveable, skid-mounted building that 
was located on Stangl's portion of the property. The specific 
amount attributable to this improvement, as specified and set forth 
by the Salt Lake County Assessor in the Tax Notices for those years 
(Exhibits F through J), has been deducted from the amounts subject 
to apportionment for the purposes of calculating Wade's 
proportionate share of the property taxes. The building was 
removed from the property in 1987. Exhibits K through N, the 
county Tax Notices for 1987 through 1990, reflect this absence of 
any improvements on the property. 
(c) In 1988 Stangl conveyed 0.65 acres from his part of 
the property for use as a public road. Exhibits L, M and N, the 
county Tax Notices for 1988, 1989 and 1990, reflect this reduction 
in the total amount of acreage. This conveyance modified, 
slightly, the ownership percentage of each party. 
(d) In August of 1989, Stangl engaged Strategis Asset 
Valuation and Management Company to appeal the amount of taxes 
STGL\080.wc - 0068 
assessed to the jointly-owned property for 1989. Strategis 
succeeded in lowering the 1989 taxes from $27,029.80 to $11,752.02, 
a savings of $15,277.78 to both parties. Strategis' fee for such 
action was 33.3% of the reduction amount of $15,277.78, or 
$5,087.50. Tivie—amount—should—properly—be—concidorod—a—tax-
rclatod—oxponce inuring to—the—benefit—of—both parties—and—ie 
therefore—added—to—the—tax—amount—£os—1989—to—be—apportioned 
between the parties along with the tax for that year. 
14. The parties further agree that if acreage-based 
apportionment is found by the Court to be appropriate, Exhibit Q 
accurately sets forth the apportioned property taxes for the tax 
years 1982 through 1990 based on the acreage owned by each party 
and the equal division of acreage beneath the right-of-way. For 
the 1991 tax year, the two parcels will for the first time be taxed 
separately. Therefore, no apportioned amount is included in 
Exhibit Q for the year 1991. 
15. The parties further agree that if acreage-based 
apportionment is found by the Court to be appropriate and if the 
Court determines that Stangl is entitled to prejudgment interest 
in accordance with Utah Code Ann. S 15-1-1(2) on Wade's share of 
the taxes so apportioned, Exhibit Q accurately sets forth the 
prejudgment interest on Wade's proportionate share and the total 
amount of taxes and interest owed by Wade to Stangl. 
STGL\080.vc 
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DATED this 3 day of October, 1991. 
STGL\080.wc 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Daniel A 
Attorneys fo 
ruce J, Nelson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
^C^s*^. Vv***.. H ^ W o - Vjfev^t 0-*A Asa 
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4370 SOUTH SOO V.LST 
SPECIALISTS IN COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL PLANN1NQ AND O f V f c O ' M f N T 
D e c e m b e r 8 , 1980 
Mr. Stanley Wade 
2159 Par ley ' s Terrace 
Salt Lake Ci ty , Utah 84109 
Dear Stan: 
CERTIFIED MAIL R.R.R. 
CERTIFICATE NO. 0596800 
Please consider this letter as notification of the following 
items: 
1. A billing for your portion of the 1980 property taxes as per 
the Purchase Agreement on the land located at 9225 South 7th 
East in Sandy, Utah. 
2. A notice of your default of the aforementioned Purchase Agree-
ment for nonpayment of the 1979 property taxes and interest 
owed for the period between the closing date and the date of 
the first payment. (Previous billing enclosed.) 
Enclosed is a copy of the tax notice and receipt for payment of 
the 1980 property taxes on the land covered by your Purchase Agreement. Your 
portion has been computed as follows: 
$3,843.80 4 430,340.81 sq. ft. x 284,573.36 sq. ft. - $2,541.81 
$3,843.80 T 430,340.81 sq. ft. x 120,617.45 sq. ft. = $1,077.35 
$3,843.80 x 430,340.81 sq. ft. x 25,150.00 sq. ft. = $ 224.64 
Wade - Basic Area $2,541.81 
h Right of Way 112.32 
$2,654.13 
Stangl - Basic Area $1,077.35 
k Right of Way 112.32 
$1,189.67 
To date, the following monies are owed: 
Interest $ 552.85 
1979 Property Taxes 2,381.04-
1980 Property Taxes 2,654.13 
f ^ 
* / / * ' * ' 
December 1980 Payment 2,586.41-7 f£- u/is/to 
$8,174.43 * X,*86.*Z 
00730 
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May we please have your check for $8,174.43 made payable to Franz 
C. Stangl, III at the above letterhead address within twenty (20) days in 
order to correct your existing default and conclude your 1980 obligation as 
per the Purchase Agreement. 
Sincerely, 
F. C. STANGL CONSTRUCTION CO. 
'^ yZianj^ 
Elizabeth Stangl 
EAS:pjw 
Enclosures 
00731 
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S+ECtALiSlS i* COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL PLANNING AND DBVELOPMEN1 
January 4, 1982 
Mr. Stanley Wade 
2159 Parley's Terrace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Mr. Stanley Wade 
918 Logan Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Dear Stan: 
1 am writing to acknowledge the receipt of the checks in the 
following amounts: 
A. F. C. Stangl's check to you for $2,586.91 
B. Your checks for: (1) $ 618.52 Interest 
(2) $10,347.64 Oct. f81-Jan. f82 payments 
(3) $ 2,586.91 Sept. f81 payment 
(4) $ 2,654.13 1980 taxes (incorrect $) 
We are depositing the above checks in anticipation of (1) your 
bringing in the signed documents that I understand you were to bring today, 
and (2) your payment of 1981 property taxes. 
Apparently you did not understand how the 1981 property tax proration 
was achieved. It was figured exactly the same way as were the previous years 
taxes as shown on the "corrected billing" (copy enclosed). That is: 
Total tax ($4,335.56) i by total acreage (9.632) x Wade 
acreage (6.87) « $3,092.33. 
Thus of the total $19,511.93 as broken down on the attached "corrected 
billing" sheet, agreed as owed, and subsequently written into the new documents 
as owing, $16,207.20 has been paid and $3,304.73 is still due. 
An additional "corrected billing" sheet has been enclosed showing 
paid and due dollars in red. If I have made an error in my computations, 
I will be glad to sit down with you so that it may be corrected. 
X * e 
.** 
However, I expect to either hear from you immediately regarding 
any billing error or receive both the dollars due and the signed documents 
by return mail. 
Sincerely, 
F. C. STANGL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
El izabeth Stangl 
EASrpjw 
Enclosures 
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^^S5tr§<^KSTRUCTlON CO. 4370 SOUTH 500 V.£ T 
May 14, 1980 
Stanley Wad( 
Sal? 7PaJley'S 7 e r r a c * 
5>alt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Dear Stan: 
P « « n e n t p o r t l o n ^ | ^ P r | u r c I a h r e g e ^ t e / a ^ « / , | % h e 
Tax 
Wade - Basic Area
 2 2 g 0 ,_ 
% r i g h t of way ' fgg'Jg 
238T70T 
Stangl - Basic Area
 9 6 6 „ 
% r ight of way 100." #7 
TOTAL 3?4~8737 
00751 
Page two 
May 14, 1980 
Stanley Wade 
In sunnary, the following monies are due: 
Interest $ 552,85 
1979 Property Taxes 2,381.04 
Total Due $2,933.89 
Kay ve please have your check for $2,933.89 made payable to Franz C. Stangl at the above letterhead address by return mail. 
Sincerely, 
ELIZABETH STANGL 
ES:njf 
enc: 
F. C. STANGL CONSTRUCTION CO. 
4455 SOUTH 700 EAST . SUITE 300 . SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 • PHONE (801) 262-0381 
SPECIALISTS IN COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 
November 24, 1986 
Mr. Stanley Wade < ^ ^ 0 ^ ^ "-
2159-Bariey's Terrace ^ 0 J] 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 )LjLf 
Dear Stan: 
Ehoch Bautista contacted this office on November 19, 1986 regard-
ing your desire to have the 6.87 acres (at 9225 South 700 East you con-
tracted to purchase from me on the 16th day of May, 1978) deeded to you. 
You are in default now and you have been continuously in default since 
sometime in 1981. I have sent notices to you many times, and as in the 
past, you did not respond. 
Our most recent letter to you, dated November 3, 1986, written by 
Liz Stangl, gave you one last chance to clean up the delinquencies with-
out penalites and interest. You chose to ignore it until after the 
November 13, 1986 deadline set in the letter. On November 20, 1986, 
someone from your office brought a copy of an A-1 Distributing check 
#1040, dated November 13, 1986, made out to F.C. Stangl Construction in 
the amount of $19,810.74. This delivery was made a week after the offered 
no-penalty dated pa'ssed and the day after I told Enoch Bautista that I 
would no longer accept the amount set forth on the November 3, 1986 
letter ($19,810.74), but that I would calculate the amount of penalty and 
interest as assessed by the Salt Lake County Treasurer for the years of 
back taxes and he cculd pay that amount on your behalf. The following is 
a list of 
$2,749.69 
$3,781.05 
$4,044.79 
$4,588.71 
$4,654.50 
$19,810.74 
monies due as 
1982 Taxes 
1983 Taxes 
1984 Taxes 
1985 Taxes 
1986 Taxes 
quoted to Mr. 
Penalty 2% 
$54.83 
75.62 
80.90 
91.77 
N/A Now 
Bautista: 
Interest to 
11/28/86 
§ 8% $868.81 
@ 8% 891.49 
§ 8% 625.59 
§13% 548.48 
N/A Now 
TOTAL DOE ON 11/28/86 
TOTAL 
$3,665.33 
4,748.16 
4,751.28 
5,228.96 
4,654.50 
$23,048.23 
The person that left the copy of the check also left a handwritten 
note that says the check will be turned over to Utah Title. It is of no 
significance to me who it is turned over to. It is made out to the 
incorrect payee for the incorrect amount and dated a date different than 
the date it was offered for payment. 
007 
Mr. Stanley Wade 
November 24, 1986 
Page Two 
If you will prepare a check for the correct amount, $23,048.23\sif 
prior to November 28, 1986/ and to the correct payee, namely the seller 
under the contract, F.C. Stangl III and give it to me, the deed you 
request can be then prepared and delivered to you. I will clear up the 
delinquent taxes due to Salt Lake County and deliver you a clear title 
insurance policy, as called for in the contract. 
You really know hew to try a person's patience! 
Sincerely, 
F.C. Stangl III 
or 755 
LAW OFFICES OF 
M A A K & M A A K 
A PftO'CSSiOMAl COKI>0«AriON 
370 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SUITE 3 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841II 
T C L C ^ H O N C ( S O I ) 3 5 B - 7 T O O 
E5 L. MAAK 
A. MAAK 
November 19, 1981 
MAILED BY REGISTERED MAIL 
AND CERTIFIED MAIL, 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Mr. Stanley Wade 
2159 Parley's Terrace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Re: Agreement dated May 16, 1978 concern-
ing land located at approximately 
9225 South 700 East, Sandy, Utah 
Dear Mr. Wade: 
As you know, I represent F. C. Stangl III in connection 
with the referenced Agreement. 
By the terms of the referenced Agreement, you have for 
some time been obligated to pay to Mr. Stangl the following 
amounts: 
Four installments, each in 
the amount of $2,586.91, due 
on the first days of August, 
September, October, and 
November, 1981 $ 10,347.64 
Interest accrued between the 
closing date of the Agree-
ment and June 1, 1978 552.85 
1980 property taxes 2,654.13 
Total $ 13,554.62 
In addition to the foregoing amounts, Mr. Stangl has 
incurred attorney's fees in attempting to enforce this Agreement 
by virtue of your default. The amount of such attorney's fees is 
not yet precisely ascertainable. 
Both the undersigned and personnel at Mr. Stangl's 
office have mailed and/or delivered to you a large number of 
oc 
Mr. Stanley Wade 
November 19, 1981 
Page 2 
letters and requests requesting payment of the foregoing sums, 
all of which you are obligated to pay by the terms of the Agree-
ment. 
In the event that you have not paid to Mr. Stangl the 
foregoing sums within ten (10) days after the giving of this 
written notice, Mr. Stangl will exercise his rights and remedies 
under Section 8.3 of the Agreement"! My advice by my letter of 
October 27, 1981 that Mr. Stangl intended to exercise his rights 
under Section 8.1 of the Agreement was in error, and you should 
disregard that advice. 
BAM:rj 
cc: Mr. F. C. Stangl III 
Certified No. 4586582 
0f;^rc VK; 
W . ^ L O ^ "V C O V V f RCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL PLANNING AND 0£V£LOPK»ENT 
January 29, 1982 
Mr. Stanley Wade 
2159 Parley1s Terrace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Mr. Stanley Wade 
918 Logan Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Dear Stan: 
I apologize for not explaining fully enough how the tax billings 
were arrived at. 
Until 1981, I was going on the assumption that the amount of Total 
Acreage was the same as that indicated on the site plan here in our office. 
So, until 1981, 1 was using (1) 9.879 acres as the Total Acreage 
involved and (2) a parcel 817 feet x 348.315 feet indicated on our site 
plan as yours, plus (3) one half of a parcel 50 feet x 503 feet indicated 
on our site plan as the right of way in order to come up with your billing. 
After having the property surveyed, we found that the Total Acreage 
was only 9.632 acres and that one half of the right of way is within your 
6.87 acres. Consequently, I refigured the taxes based on the true numbers. 
Since I thought that I had been charging you for your acreage plus part of 
the right of way, I frankly assumed I had been overcharging you for taxes, 
but it does not work out that way. The square footage I had been charging 
you for was actually only 6.82 acres and the Total Acreage was less than I 
had figured. 
Until 1981 you were charged thus: 
Total Tax divided by Total Sq. Ft. x Wade Sq. Ft. • Wade $ 
Total Tax divided by Total Sq. Ft. x H Right of Way Sq. Ft. » Wade $ 
Total Wade Bill 
When tax bills were corrected they were computed thus: 
Total Tax divided by Total Acreage x Wade Acreage « Wade Bill 
» y 
00732 
Attached is a schedule comparing the two methods shown above and 
the results. 
I appreciate receiving your check for the balance showing in my 
letter of January 4th in the amount of $3,304,73 in anticipation of my 
sending the scheduled breakdown. 
Sincerely, 
F. C. STANGL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
Elizabeth Stangl 
EAS:pjw 
Enclosures 
00733 

f- v 
- . j r - . u - C jN i p.v-.r; 
5 - 1 6 - 7 3 
7 - 1 - 7 B 
e-:s-7a 
9 - 1 0 ^ 7 9 
10-2v5- -7P 
H - 1 4 - 7 S 
1 £ - 9 6 - 7 8 
1 - 1 5 - 7 9 
8 - i e - 7 9 
3 - 1 6 - 7 ^ 
4 - I S - - 7 9 
5 - 1 7 - 7 9 
6 - 1 4 ~ 7 9 
7 - P A - 7 9 
8 - 5 4 - 7 9 : 
1 0 - 1 - 7 9 
1 0 - 8 3 - 7 9 
1 1 - 8 5 - 7 9 
1 - 3 - - & 0 
2—4—SO 
3 - 7 - 8 0 
4 - 9 - 8 0 
5 - 8 - 3 0 
5 - 1 S - B 0 
7-2o-io 
8 - i g - s o 
9 - 3 P ~ . n o 
1 0 - ; 6 - -A •". 
- 1 - 1 3 - 8 0 
1 - 1 7 - E i " 
2 - 1 6 - 8 1 
3 - 1 6 - 9 2 
4 - 1 4 9 : 
A - i 7 - 8 i 
7 - £ 0 - 9 l 
£ - l S - ~ i i 
a y ' t A m o u n t 
. . S P / , Q 
I n i 
W 1 2 , 5 8 . ; 
2 , 5 8 6 , p 
2 , 5 8 6 , 9 : 
2 , 5 8 6 . 9 1 
2 > - J £ ? 6 . 9 l 
9 , 5 5 - , 9 1 
2 , 5 8 - . 8 1 
2 , 5 8 6 . 9 1 
2 „ 5 S 6 S « 1 
£ , 5 8 6 , 9 1 
= . .53 £ . 9 1 
2 j 5 8 6 . 9 1 
2 , 5 8 6 . 9 1 
2 , 5 8 6 . 9 1 
2 , 5 8 6 . 9 1 
2 , 5 8 6 . 9 1 
2
 5 58* . . , 91 
2 , 5 8 6 . 9 1 
2 , 5 8 6 . 9 1 
2 , 5 8 6 . 9 : 
2 , 5 9 6 . 9 1 
- • , 5 8 6 . 8 1 
2 , ^ 8 6 , < = M 
2 , 5 8 - . 9 1 
2 , 5 8 6 , < n 
2 . 5 9 6 . " 1 
2 , 5 8 6 . 9 1 
2 , S 3 . - . 9 1 
2 , '>96 . 91 
9 . 5 8 6 , 9 1 
2 , ^ 8 6 . 9 ! 
2 . 5 8 6 . 9 1 
l .--• i_-; c 
» . - ' 8 6 . 9 3 
8 , 5 8 6 . 9 1 
2 , 5 8 6 , - i 
' : , ' 3 8 6 . ? i 
'• •'
 c
- ' „ " • •• •• ^ . 
8 ^ 5 3 6 ^ ; ' 
1 , ". OS . oo 
- < 0 9 4 . 5 0 
1 > 0 8 3 , 9 3 
1
- 0 7 3 . 8 9 
1
 .. 06c?, 5 6 
1 5 0 5 1 . 7 7 
1 , 0 4 0 , 8 9 
1 , 0 3 9 . ? ; . 
1
 . - 0 1 8 . 9 1 
3 5 0 0 7 , 8 1 
l ? 9 6 . 6 £ 
~ C ...J 
974 
•
r
 c c. 
95 i 
939 
9E7, 
916, 
904 . 
898
 s 
860. 
369. 
656. 
8 L3, 
.951 . , 
81 ^ 
;
 - 36 
.01 
r
~ 0 
.03 
-SO 
»33 
.07 
. 34 
33 
38 
33 
05 
7Q 
'
lS 
-1 
*
:>55 . 5 • 
742 . " l53 
7 2 9 . 4 7 
1
 ••' .-• -
5 4 9 . 9 A 
5 3 5 . - 9 
4 ? 1 , 6 3 
4 7 6 - 7 3 
^ 6 1 . 3 4 
• - 4 / . •••? • - . 
•
h4~ .1. HC i n : 
1 . 4 8 1 . 9 1 
•I .-.•'+98. <+i 
i .» 5 0 2 . 9 9 
^ S i a . / p 
1 -, 5 8 4 . 3 ^ ; 
U546.08 
1 , 5 5 6 . 9 7 
1 , 5 6 8 , OC; 
1 » 5 7 9 . 1 0 
1 , 5 9 0 . 8 9 
15 6 0 1 . 5 s 
1? 6 1 3 , 9 0 
1 , 6 8 4 , 3 8 
1
" 6 3 5 . 8 3 
1 . - 6 4 7 , 4 1 
1 , 6 5 9 . 0 8 
1 - 6 7 0 , 8 4 
j
 - O B 8 . 6 7 
1 .* 69*".B 5 9 
1 . -706 " 5 9 
1 - ? 1 8 . 6 R 
1 - 7 3 0 , 6 6 
1 r "?4 8
 m IT) 
"7 -. cr <• • 
1,767,90 
• • • • • ' - • ' . . / , 4 1 ^ 
I " 7 Q 3 . C i 
1 , 8 0 5
 a ^ 3 
- s L.'3"!. . c-t(> 
1'>?*<<. & < 
1 , s«? 7 . - / , 
1 . e^o.oo 
.1
 r r '? ; ' : . P S 
l j - ' l 9 7 . Vo 
- " ' • • » : : - 3 
3
 '
w 3 - , u 
1 • . . : • , • ) ' . , ' 
- , O * A S A 3 
2 . - 0 3 6 . 9 5 
-"•• ? 0 5 1 ,; 8 J 
^ » 0 6 5 , 9 i 
c. - 0 8 :*>, ^"s 
2 . - 0 9 5 . " p r l 
3 , 1 1 •:>.
 : 9 
* , 1 2 5 , o r ? 
B a l a n c e 
"^56 , 0 0 0
 s 0 0 
1 3 ^ . - 5 1 8 . 0 ^ 
1 S I ,->-.n«nr , -
- - > •-••...„•
 a 6 -•< 
1 3 0 , 0 0 9 . 0 8 
148
 8. w 8 4 . ^4. 
1 4 6 , 9 4 9 . H « 
1^'55 4 0 3 8 5 8 
1 4 8 5 8 4 A n A1 
! / + S . - ; i 7 s " 6 t 
1 4 0 5 6 9 9 , S 2 
1 3 9 , I 0 9 e p- . 
1 3 7 , 3 0 7 ^ 6 7 
1 3 5 , 8 9 4 . 7 7 
1 3 ^ , 8 ^ 0 ."45 
1 3 8 , 6 3 4 , 6 8 
1 3 0 , ^ 8 7 S P O 
1 po T'Sr
 M -
*
:
- - n wCT, . 1 8 
l £ 7 5 A 5 7 t 8 8 
1 3 5 , 9 7 4 „ A ] 
134 , 33C». OP 
^ 8 , 5 7 3 . 4 3 
1 8 0 , 6 5 4 . 7 5 
1 1 9 , 1 3 3 . P Q 
1 1 7 , 4 P ^ 7 P 
n 5 , 6 3 e . 8 1 
^ 1 " f t r - r 1 
A
 -t •-•"> j 8 b / . 4 ; J 
1 1 ?
 < 0 ? 7 4 r w ; 
1 
i 
.1 
1, 
c. 
c 
r-
o~ 
• :«.«> 
04 
08 
f
"* 1 
lT '"> 
'-' f 
- ' * 
"' '!. -
5 
, 88 
5^8 
5 J rL. 
n vl •'.!• 
» .T''" 7! 
. -c 1 7 ' 
56.-
A '••*'" 
6 7 ;< 
•'Q
 ( 
:
 9 
"3 , 
3. 
6. 
•"j 
3. 
'f .. 
'' i 
r. \: 
» do' 
.'/: 1 
31 
93 
/.. c 
':>r;> 
05 
V-A 
• • ' ' " - ' ; 
'"• .. 
•i :-i 
•' •-', 6 0 ' - ;
 4 91 
6 9 , 4 0 6 , 0 7 
6 - 0 3 1 0 , 7 8 
^ 5 , 8 0 0 - /-^ 
0 9 . n ^ s 
I /C I 
DEC 
3z.n 
F e b 
£_•£ 
1 9 8 3 
To I E 
£ , Z.-2L-. V: . 
t... » _ . . . •_.? • . ._ 
3 - 5 3 6 , - 1 
-' . 5 6 6 :. 9 1 
2 . £ 8 6 , 9 1 
3 . '3 36 . 9 1 
£ , 5 8 6 . 9 1 
P c -n /„ Q | 
£ , 5 3 6 .-91 
3 , V 3 6 , 9 i 
«... r _ -.. w t .• I 
r., ...co • 7 i 
S ! 5 8 6 . - 7 1 
3 . 5 3 6 . 9 1 
S ; 5 8 6 . V I 
1 9 9 3 
• « \ r - —i 
L 7 C w / 3 i . ' 3 3 
<>31 .63 
4 1 6 . ' 3 6 
/ ; . i /" _ •: • Q 
-:wr-, •=;*'•• 
'36^ , 9 1 
3 5 4
 S 3 0 
T «|C' "J>'~" 
3 3 3 . 4 6 
3 0 6 * 4 3 
3 9 0 . 3 7 
37<-: . 0 0 
u D / .-. ''!?-'.' 
S^ 1 , 1 3 
££'/.i
 5 '5 < 
3 0 7 . 7 7 
9
 ? 1 ••) 9 s 1 9 • 
u/y , 0 4 9 , 0 7 
.-
 B 1 1 - •-. 
£ , 1 7 ' . 
.r { cc-. 
p „ r>(:. • 
3 , 3 1 ^ 
-j" z- o 
Z> Z2 ..'- • 
~. i.-C.'.-' • 
r.
 s t:.:. -r ::• 
£ ? 3 1 3 
3 , 3 c ^ 
E ,. 3"? 5 
3 : 3 6 3 
•"" i • " . ' "" 
i-^ r;_ 
u r t ••:, 
**
:
 _'2 
. • I i 
. OJ0 
, ? 1 
. 5 3 
, 4 5 
, 4 9 
, 6 4 
Q i 
. P'-*? 
. 7 9 
,. 4-1 
. 14 
t-. •.. 
CV
, A 
5 4 
•".
:
 -"! 
5 0 
•• ^  7 
i k 5 
••+. 'j 
u r\ 
3 3 
3 6 
34 
31 
3 -
£ 6 
3 
i_i *"/ 
7P:() . £; 
. ^ ; S'...- £ V 
:. >33 , 7 " 
,, 3 3 3 - 3-
r 0 0 5 , 7 -
. 7 9 3 • 5 3 
, 5 3 4
 E 0 * 
, 3 5 9 „ t>3 
i..>'7Q i Z; 
, A P - ' . n'-? 
, 0 4 0 , 3 ? 
.. *••.-> ^ . 4 ? 
"ZJ -< • v 
, 0 9 2 , b?. 
\re-yy~v~'y^\ ~H^r^ 
t * 
'**« J*-J> ifa/iz 
I 
<hli-
-Z-CS^f '5 
i t 
"5?oH- ^ 
£, «g?_ _ / w /^- >-J ^*- r^'y 
00737 
W38 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR 
Room 309 City & County Buiidmg 
Salt Lake Oty. Utah 84111/ 
December 18, 1984 
The Honorable Board of County Conrrissioners 
Room 407, Ci ty 4 County Bui ld ing 
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
R. MILTON YORGASON 
COUNTY ASSESSOR 
ELEANOR LEE BRENNAN 
CHiEF OsPJTY 
Attention: D.M. Stewart Re: Parcel No. 38-05-351-006 
Serial No. 34A 0175-151 
Adjustment of 1981-1983 General 
Taxes 
Gentlemen: 
Ke kindly request that you adjust the 1981, 1982 and 1983 general 
taxes on Parcel No. 38-05-351-006 (Serial No. 34A 0175-151) as shown 
below and abate all balance, penalties and interest if paid within 30 
days. 
YEAR 
1933 
1982 
1981 
0RI6INAL TAXES 
S6249.90 
4531.84 
4335.56 
CORRECTED TAXES 
S5503.77 
3993.30 
3820.35 
AMOUNT ADJUSTED 
S746.13 
538.54 
515.21 
S13317.42 Total due I.719.S? 
A carwash on th i s property was double assessed w i th Parcel No. 
28-05-351-001. 
I f you agree wi th our recommendation, please advise the County 
Treasurer accordingly 
TO. ARTHUR L MDrfCCN CCJr.TY TREASURER 
THE BOARD O? CptfVT. COMV.'SSiONSRS 
APOPOVEO t ~ ) OZU'.tO ( ) 
THIS LETTER AT ITS MEETING HELD ON: 
H. olCoW HINDLEY. co jrrrt) cfwE^m 
Comrr.' 
.ts&lon Ciert 
Very t r u l y yours , 
R. MILTON YORGASON, County Assessor 
} f- ' * . • * " * 
RLY:tk 
cc: F. C. Stangl, III 
6270 S. Van Cott Rd. 
SLC, Utah 84121 
F 
EleanorTee Brennan-Fessler 
/ y£h ie f Deputy 
f' 00760 
. SAwT L A K t C4TY. UTAH S4t07 • PHONE (BOD 232-0381 
A\Z it.C^STAtAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 
November 3/ 1986 
Mr. Stanley Wade 
2159 Parley's Terrace 
Salt Lake City/ UT 84109 
Dear Stan: 
Enclosed are copies of the 1985 and 1986 tax notices on the property 
located at 9225 South 700 East in Sandy/ Utah, 
Following is a breakdown showing your pro rata share of the 
aforementioned taxes. 
1985 
$6/433.55 -j 
$6/433.55 -: 
- 9.632 Total acres X 
- 9.632 Total acres X 
6.87 acres = $4/588.71 - Wade 
2.762 acres= $1/844.84 - Stangl 
$6,433.55 
1986 
$6/525.78 -: 
$6/525.78 -: 
- 9.632 Total acres X 
- 9.632 Total acres X 
6.87 acres = $4/654.50 - Wade 
2.762 acres= $1/871.28 - Stangl 
$6/525.78 
The property taxes billed to you on 9/21/82 and 1/30/85 for 1982/ 
1983 and 1984 are still outstanding. 
Thus/ the following monies are due: 
$2/741.69 
3/781.05 
4/044.79 
4/588.71 
4/654.50 
$19/810.74 
1982 taxes 
1983 taxes 
1984 taxes 
1985 taxes 
1986 taxes 
TOTAL DUE 
We need to receive a check for $19/810.74 sent to the above 
letterhead address by return mail in order to clear this up. If we 
receive a check for the total due within ten (10) days of the above dated 
letter/ we will waive the tax penalties and accruing interest. If not 
received by 11/13/86/ all penalties and interest as assessed by the Salt 
Lake Treasurer will be applied. 
Sincerely/ 
Elizabeth Ann Stangl 
Property Management ©0071 
EAS:sde 
Exhibit I 
Stephen G. Crockett (A0766) 
Daniel A. Jensen (A5296) 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY L. WADE, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
F. C. STANGL III, | 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
• PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I Civil No. C-87-357 
i Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant F. C. Stangl III ("Stangl") hereby responds to 
plaintiff Stanley L. Wade's ("Wade") Motion for Summary Judgment. 
As specifically argued below, Stangl categorically denies (1) that 
the material facts of this lawsuit are undisputed and (2) that Wade 
is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law. 
DISPUTATION OF WADE'S "RELEVANT" FACTS 
Stangl responds as follows to the statement of "relevant" 
facts set forth in Wade's supporting memorandum: 
With regard to Wade's relevant fact No. 1, Stangl denies and 
disputes that "[t]he Salt Lake County assessor assessed the 
, u * 
. - i 
- A \Kic7U 
STGL\0A3.wc 0C4J6 
frontage acreage at a higher rate than the rear acreage." In 
reality, both parcels have been taxed as one parcel ever since the 
property was sold to Wade. Wade admits as much in his fact No. 2 
when he states that "the parcels have not been segregated for tax 
purposes," that they cannot be so segregated until a deed is 
recorded, and that the two parcels have been taxed as one parcel. 
Wade's only support for his assertion that the two parcels 
were assessed at different rates is paragraphs 5 and 6 of the 
Affidavit of A. Paul Schwenke. The opinions recited in those 
paragraphs of the Schwenke affidavit are hearsay and are 
inadmissible. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e); Western States 
Thrift & Loan Co. v. Bloomauist. 504 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1972). 
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Schwenke affidavit also constitute 
conclusory and unsubstantiated opinions and are inadmissible for 
those additional reasons. Treloggan v. Trelocrgan, 699 P.2d 747 
(Utah 1985); Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). Stangl, 
therefore, objects to the Affidavit of A. Paul Schwenke and Wade's 
attempted use of it. 
Stangl also disputes Wade's characterization of the two 
parcels as "front" and "rear." Although Wade's parcel is located 
behind Stangl's with respect to 700 East Street, Wade's parcel 
includes a 50-foot wide right-of-way to 700 East Street so that 
access to both parcels is the same. 
STGL\043.wc 
-2- 00417 
With regard to Wade's relevant fact No. 2, Stangl agrees that 
the parcels have not been segregated for tax purposes, but denies 
and disputes that the "larger parcel is taxed as one unit." It is 
the entire parcel (made up of Wade's larger parcel and Stangl's 
smaller parcel) that is taxed as one unit. 
With regard to Wade's relevant fact No. 3, Stangl agrees 
(except for the same inaccurate reference to the "larger" parcel 
as discussed above) that Wade was charged his share of the taxes 
based on the area owned by each party (although it was based on 
acreage rather than square footage). Stangl has no knowledge as 
to why Wade decided to stop paying on this basis (or any basis) 
after approximately three years. 
With regard to Wade's relevant fact No. 4, Stangl agrees that 
Wade refused to pay any taxes (after 1981), but denies and disputes 
that Wade's refusal was conditioned on a determination of "the 
taxes attributable to his portion of the land." The record 
reflects that Wade never offered any excuse for his cessation of 
tax payments. In fact, until recently Wade denied that he owed 
any taxes whatsoever for the years 1978 through 1985 (the term of 
the installment land contract). See Plaintiff's Answers to 
Defendant's First Request for Admissions and First Set of 
Interrogatories, Response to Interrogatory No. 2. 
With regard to Wade's relevant fact No. 5, Stangl agrees that 
Wade eventually completed making the required payments in 1985, but 
STGL\0A3.wc 
-3- 00418 
denies and disputes that this "completed" Wade's performance under 
the contract. Wade's performance has never been completed because 
of his refusal to pay the tax debt attributable to his property. 
Under the terms of the contract (Wade's Exhibit A) in paragraph 8, 
Stangl is not obligated to convey a deed to the property so long 
as Wade is in default, and Stangl alleges that Wade's failure to 
pay his tax debt is a default under the contract. 
Finally, with regard to Wade's relevant fact No. 6, Stangl 
agrees with the facts set forth therein, but notes that the action 
was filed on January 13, 1987, rather than January 20, 1987. 
As a final, but important, matter with regard to factual 
disputes, Stangl points out to the Court that six months ago Wade 
argued to the Utah Supreme Court that there are factual disputes 
at issue in this matter precluding summary judgment. The Utah 
Supreme Court agreed, and vacated this Court's order of summary 
judgment. The facts of this dispute today are identical to the 
facts that existed previously when Wade argued, successfully, 
against summary judgment. Wade has not offered any explanation for 
the sudden disappearance of the previously existing factual 
disputes. The unexplained abandonment of Wade's prior argument 
that summary judgment is inappropriate is compelling evidence of 
the amount of credence that should be given to his present 
argument. 
STGLV0A3.VC 
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DISPUTATION OF WADE'S LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The crux of Wade's legal argument is that the Utah Supreme 
Court "held as a matter of law that the real estate contract in 
question does not provide for on going obligation [sic] for real 
estate taxes," and that Wade is therefore only liable for the taxes 
attributable to his land under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion. Wade's supporting memorandum at 2-3. Wade then argues 
that the amount attributable should be based on the assessed value 
of the property. Thus, Wade does not dispute his liability for the 
taxes, but only the amount attributable to his land. 
The Supreme Court's only "holding" was that "material facts 
are in dispute" and that summary judgment was therefore not 
appropriate. The court's brief explanatory comments concerning 
contractual obligations do not amount to findings of fact or 
conclusions of law and do not resolve the existing factual and 
legal disputes. Indeed, the case was remanded to this Court for 
the taking of evidence and for further proceedings as appropriate 
in light of that evidence. The Supreme Court's order vacating 
summary judgment does not resolve the issue of Wade's contractual 
liability or the manner in which Wades's liability for back taxes 
should be determined. 
Wade then attempts to explain why the amount of taxes 
attributable to his land should be based on the assessed values of 
each parcel. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the 
STGL\043.vc 
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"assessed value" of the two parcels for each year since 1978. As 
Wade acknowledges in his fact No. 2, the parcels have never been 
segregated for tax purposes, cannot be so segregated without the 
recording of a deed, and have been taxed since 1978 as one parcel. 
Wade's counsel has attempted to overcome this problem by providing 
calculations according to his belief as to the values of the land 
based on hearsay evidence obtained through conversations with 
someone at the county assessor's office. Notwithstanding a sincere 
attempt, these calculations are nonunderstandable. 
Moreover, the entire basis of Wade's calculations is 
erroneous. Paragraph 5 of the Affidavit of A. Paul Schwenke 
states, pursuant to a hearsay conversation, that "the land bought 
by the Plaintiff had a gross market value of $20,000.00 per acre." 
Yet paragraph 13 of the 1978 sales contract (Wade's Exhibit A) 
provides that if after a survey of Wade's property there is more 
or less than the contemplated 6.87 acres, "the purchase price will 
be adjusted up or down based on a per acre price of $30,000." This 
clearly indicates that the parties considered the value of the 
property to be $30,000 per acre rather than $20,000 as used in 
Wade's calculations. 
In any event, Stangl denies and disputes that Wade's approach 
to calculating the parties' respective tax liabilities is proper 
in fact or in law. Wade has cited no legal authority to show that 
the "assessed value" (which is likely impossible to determine in 
STGL\043.vc 
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any event) is the only or proper method for calculating the taxes 
attributable to his land. 
Stangl asserts that the proper method, in law and in fact, for 
calculating the parties' respective tax liabilities is to apportion 
the taxes based on the amount of acreage owned by each party. 
Wade's purchase was in the form of a seven-year installment land 
contract by which Wade bought 71% of a parcel of land owned by 
Stangl. Stangl retained an adjacent 29% of his property. The 
contract imposed on Wade an obligation to pay a proportionate share 
of property taxes and assessments for the year of the closing 
(1978) (see Wade's Exhibit A, Jf 6, 7.3) , but the contract did not 
state how the real property taxes were to be divided during the 
remainder of the seven-year executory period. 
Wade paid for his proportionate share of the property taxes 
for the years 1978 through 1981 based on the proportionate amount 
of acreage owned by each party. However, since 1982 Wade has 
refused to contribute his proportionate share, or any share, of the 
real property taxes assessed to the property. Stangl has been 
forced to pay the entire amount himself each year since 1981. 
Thus, for each year in which Wade paid any taxes toward the 
subject property the parties used the acreage apportionment method 
to divide liability for the real property taxes, with Wade paying 
71.34% of the taxes (based on ownership of 6.87 acres of the 9.63-
STGL\043.vc 
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acre tract) and Stangl paying 28.66% (based on ownership of 2.76 
acres of the 9.63-acre tract). 
While the parties' installment land contract (Wade's Exhibit 
A) does not expressly specify how the property tax liability is to 
be allocated during the seven-year executory period following the 
year of the closing, it does state that taxes for the year 1978 are 
to be "prorated at the closing" and that "the parties shall prorate 
all taxes and assessments relating to the Property in accordance 
with the latest tax and assessment bills." See Wade's Exhibit A, 
H 6, 7.3. It is undisputed that the parties continued to prorate 
the taxes according to the acreage owned by each party for the 
years 1979, 1980 and 1981. See Wade's relevant fact No. 3. The 
parties have never used any other method of allocating the property 
taxes. Wade argues, however, that because the installment land 
contract does not expressly state how the real property taxes are 
to be divided during the balance of the executory period, the 
parties' respective tax liabilities should be based on the separate 
"assessed values" of the two parcels rather than the acreage owned 
by each party as was done in the past. 
Wade's after-the-fact legal argument is without basis. As 
this Court recognized earlier in the dispute, the well-established 
doctrine of practical construction resolves any dispute as to the 
appropriateness of the acreage apportionment method of allocating 
the property tax liability. Under the doctrine of practical 
STGL\0A3.wc
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construction# Wade is obligated to continue to pay his share of the 
taxes based on his proportionate share of the acreage. 
"This rule of practical construction is predicated on the 
common sense concept that 'actions speak louder than words.'" 
Builouah v. Sims. 400 P.2d 20, 23 (Utah 1965). The decision in 
Builough clearly shows why Wade's prior actions obligate him to 
continue to abide by an acreage apportionment method for dividing 
the taxes. In Builough, the losing party argued that the terms of 
a written contract were unambiguous and that extrinsic evidence 
could not therefore be used to alter or change the contract. Id. 
at 22. The court responded: "This is generally true, but there 
are exceptions; one of which is that when the parties place their 
own construction on it and so perform, the court may consider this 
as persuasive evidence of what their true intention was." Id. The 
Builough court then went on to thoroughly explain the doctrine of 
practical construction, which applies directly to the present 
dispute: 
This rule of practical construction is 
predicated on the common sense concept that 
"actions speak louder than words." Words are 
frequently but an imperfect medium to convey 
thought and intention. When the parties to a 
contract perform under it and demonstrate by 
their conduct that they knew what they were 
talking about the courts should enforce their 
interest. 
Appellants correctly claim that this 
doctrine of practical construction can only be 
applied when the contract is ambiguous, and 
cannot be used when the contract is 
STGL\043.vc 
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unambiguous. That is undoubtedly a correct 
general statement of the law. [Citations 
omitted.] But the question involved in such 
cases is ambiguous to whom? Words frequently 
mean different things to different people. 
Here the contracting parties demonstrated by 
their actions that they knew what the words 
meant and were intended to mean. Thus, even 
if it be assumed that the words standing alone 
might mean one thing to the members of this 
court, where the parties have demonstrated by 
their actions and performance that to them the 
contract meant something quite different, the 
meaning and intent of the parties should be 
enforced. In such a situation the parties by 
their actions have created the "ambiguity" 
required to bring the rule into operation. If 
this were not the rule the courts would be 
enforcing one contract when both parties have 
demonstrated that they meant and intended the 
contract to be guite different. 
Id. at 23 (quoting Crestview Cemetery Ass'n v. Dieden, 356 P.2d 171 
(Cal. I960)) (emphasis added); accord Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. 
Lentz. 501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1972). 
As in Builough. Wade's prior actions speak louder than his 
present words. The first four years of Wade's undisputed conduct 
demonstrate that he understood the taxes were to be allocated on 
an acreage apportionment basis. Even if there is no express 
requirement or "ambiguity" in the written terms of the installment 
land contract with respect to ongoing tax liability, the parties 
have created the ambiguity required to bring the rule into 
Dperation. For this Court to adopt an assessed value apportionment 
scheme would be the equivalent of enforcing one contract when both 
'GL\043.vc 
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parties have demonstrated that they meant and intended the contract 
to be quite different.1 
Wade further argues that he is not responsible for any taxes 
on his land after 1984 (the termination of the contractual 
executory period) because of Stangl's alleged default in not 
conveying the property to Wade. Stangl has alleged in his 
Counterclaim (and alleges here) that Wade beached the contract four 
years prior to the termination of the contractual executory period 
when he ceased to pay, despite written demands, any amounts toward 
the taxes attributable to his property. Under paragraphs 8 and 8.1 
of the contract, Stangl was excused from conveying a deed to Wade's 
property because of Wade's default four years prior to the default 
attributed to Stangl in 1985. Stangl therefore denies and disputes 
Wade's assertion that no taxes are owned after 1984. 
*In addition to Builough, other Utah cases have similarly and 
consistently applied the doctrine of practical construction. See 
Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981) 
("Though arguably clear on its face, where the parties demonstrate 
by their actions that to them the contract meant something quite 
different, the intent of the parties will be enforced."); Zeese v. 
Estate of Siecrel. 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975) ("Under the doctrine 
of practical construction, when a contract is ambiguous and the 
parties place their own construction on their agreement and so 
perform, the court may consider this as persuasive evidence of what 
their true intention was. The parties, by their action and 
performance, have demonstrated what was their meaning and intent; 
the contract should be so enforced by the courts."). 
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2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: This is Wade v. Stangl, 
4 C87-347. Mr. Bruce Nelson here on behalf of the 
5 plaintiff, and Mr. Crockett here on behalf of the 
6 defendant. And is the plaintiff present with you? 
7 MR. NELSON: Yes, he is, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MR. CROCKETT: Mr. Stangl is present. 
10 Mr. Dan Jensen is also present on behalf of Mr. Stangl. 
11 THE COURT: All right. One thing that I 
12 don't think the record may be entirely clear about at 
13 this time, and that is, that I recused myself on a 
14 specific issue in this case, and not in the case in its 
15 entirety. 
16 The specific issue being whether or not there 
17 should be relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). The 
18 reason why I recused myself was that the issues on that 
19 motion, I felt, might appear to be or could in fact be 
20 intrinsically intertwined with prior counsel for the 
21 plaintiff, and I had referred to the Utah State Bar 
22 some difficulties that I had with prior counsel for the 
23 plaintiff. And successor counsel — and I don't mean 
24 Mr. Nelson, but some other successor counsel before Mr. 
25 Nelson came along, had some difficulties also. And I 
2 
A If the property closed mid-year, half of 
the taxes for the year would be owed by the seller, and 
the other half would be owed by the buyer. Just to 
demonstrate. And if the property was a ten acre 
parcel, and the buyer bought six acres of it, and the 
seller sold four acres of it, the seller would be 
charged with 40% of the tax amount. And the buyer 
would be charged with 60% of the tax amount based upon 
the entire assessment for the entire property. That 
is, the values or the cost of the taxes would be 
apportioned that way. 
Q You have reviewed the record, and that 
was in fact what occurred in 1978; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. After 1978, what was the 
original anticipation that would happen with regard to 
payment of taxes for the parcels? 
A We thought that the taxing authorities 
would bill each of us for our respective taxes, and we 
would each pay our respective taxes for our parcel. 
Q Did that in fact happen? 
A It did not. 
Q What happened instead? 
A The taxing authority, Salt Lake County, 
issued one tax assessment for the entire property, 
11 
1 agreement they are going to dispute was correct, and in 
2 fact that did happen. 
3 THE COURT: Anything else? 
4 MR. NELSON: No. 
5 THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
6 I do think it goes to the weight. 
7 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Maybe we can do this 
8 by stipulation, rather than Mr. Stangl trying to 
9 interpret the tax notices. We have looked at those, 
10 and let me proffer that in 19 -- where we have it 
11 written down in 1991, the parcel sold to Mr. Wade went 
12 from $8,640 in 1990 to $13,812 in 1991. The 
13 differential — would you stipulate that's what the 
14 records would show if we put them in? 
15 MR. NELSON: I'm afraid you are 
16 comparing apples and oranges. The properties weren't 
17 separated until 1991. You are comparing the large 
18 parcel assessment in 1990 to just Mr. Wade's portion in 
19 '91. 
20 MR. CROCKETT: No, we are comparing the 
21 apportionment in 1990 to what Mr. Wade's parcel was 
22 obligated in terms of taxes versus what was actually 
23 assessed in 1991 after the breakout. 
24 THE COURT: It assumes the apportionment 
25 theory. 
15 
MR, NI.'IJJION i B a s e d on t h a t a s s u m p t i o n / ~ 
and * i ^ - u s t i c k t o t h a t yi-« i 
THt (CURT I U n d e r s t a n d you d o n ' t ri91.ee 
w 1Lh a p p o r t i o n m e n t . 
MR , NF1.R0I1 I" • I. '1 - 1 
I" 1 IAJLKE FT , 1 11 ,< 
r* < By Mi . C r o c k e t t ) Mr Star i" 1 . * > 1 
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l line? 
A W11 f ** 1 1 I' * 1 * 1 ' ' d 1 i t j u i-1 t fie r i g h t 
I " 'iiiij 1 11 *vui i l l.e a g a i n s t the: n o r t h s i d e of Hie 
( M u p e r t y , or t h r n i n ^ t h e r e i v e r of ray p r o p * " ' , " " < 
1
 * r \* , ,r " . i l l I ' l r 1 in >i u>v hiiit 11! I 1 It," a d d e d Lo \ h a t 
1  j" i n ! 110 1 ut u i e . 
THK COURT: All r iqht hi il mi M U M I uue 
youp discussion1 , . <-HM,^ 1 * i,tj lontiat:! that 
1
 «. '" 1 1 M I I MI , W d d e : 
A Yee;, K 1 r „ 
Q 11 J * " 1 i' 1 Miuwleuge, make 
that posi t ion MIOWI 10 Mi. Wade, - mt you viewed that 
as amending the contract, 
A I t I J 1 '. In - 1. 11 1 otters trom my office 
t m yp r 
MR. CROCKETT: Okay V n, • • 11 n • * e 
1 would c a l l your a t t e n t i o n t o E x h i b i t "l1 ', iiml I he eoutt , 
2 « i II I n 1 1 1 1 111 ii II I I in I in if ! in i i i •" P i r i I I n t I i M • in in in i III in i in 1 * 11 in i in 
3 Exhibit "I-1". It is a packet ot l e t t e r s t h a t went ii - :i 
4 in!' 1 hat wiib put in the mall tu yo from Mr. Stangl ~J 
5 1 1 mi h i i II 1 1 1 , 
6 There i s no s t i p u l a t i o n he a c t u a l l y r ece ived 
7 i t , but t he st J pn I at i on i! c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y , t h e 
8 l e s t i n u J in \i yun MI lull I n 1 I In! ill I I in fi1 l e t ! i ? i i w c i i 1 ] i Jl c i r cell m mi 
9 the mail and sent to M L , Wade in the ordinary course mf 
10 Mi. Stangl's business; is that correct? 
i i in iMi'i i n n rii ii i i i"t i 
12 Mli CROCKET*] : AJ I right. 
13 MN NELSON For purposes mf the record, 
1 4 II II ii II 11 II I mi II II i n I n i l l i I h i 11 I I M i c i II< J i I i n ' II II i l l u l t Il 
Irauds or statute ot 1 inn tat ions issue here, I d< 
mean to waive that hy not nbjectinq In rill !"he 
questions • I wou J d 11 ke I 11 reserve I, hat un L i I wi 
here ne ot questioning qoes, if 1 may, 
T"i IE COURT: Well, wait a nixnuLe. Let's 
i-Iel., to t lie statute oi iruudi;] ILSUICJ I iqlil away, A^e 
you saying th * ratten agreement is clear and 
unequivocal a.*- r ">*,» 
I'Mi'lIM! T h e a g r e e m e n t r p r : ^ * .,: 
doesn't say a ^ * about taxes, other than 8 
I! f i x e s w iiiilcl I in "* I , M i . S t a i n , ) I "\x\i\X t- h e 
I 
1 believed thnt they amended the contract, It's my 
2 position thai any amendment to the contract would have 
3 I < I 1 1 II I mi II w i i 11 i i i  II I . 
4 MR. CROCKETT: The c o n t r a c t d o e s n ' t 
5 p r o v i d e 1 licit , number one , And 1 don ' t , be l ieve 1 we Ihrivu 
6 ill F»1 clll II! I l l it I l i l l l i l l i | l ! i l l i I ("III T i l * ' M ' 'i I I I 1 i Oil l l P O I l I l l 
7 p l e d in I h i b c a s e I t h i n k Lhal I s go ing Lo who owes 
8 what o b l i g a t i o n s on t a x e s , and rinen nut IJO t o 
9 i i i ' I v i n b i I i I \ I I ! [ u 0 | in 1 ! I  y , mill in i In wm i n II11 i i q n j i a d 
10 s t a tu t e* of f raud 1 t h i n k t h a t ' s p o s s i b l y why i t 
11 h a s n ' t been a s s e r t e d 
1 2 ¥tn N l i i . n h i I in in i ii I I I  nit" i v mid" i ii« i 
13 a r e p l y Lo t. lit* c o u n t e r c l a i m in t lie 1 l i e As I was 
14 r ev iew i in) I ho f i l e l a s t niqhl , I n o t i c e d t h e r e a r e some 
15 i lijqiJ'L i O I L . i n una u l U I L p i oad I IIL|,» , maybe a I U I J I I . 
16 o r d e r basedl upon the tan ! t h e r e i s no r e p l y t o t h e 
17 c o u n t e r c l a i m which has been f i l e d So 1 don ' t know 
1 8 viIIie111e I ji I,; w a s r a i s e d , o r not,, I u I 11 1 i k<• 1.1, r a i b e d 
19 now, if it hasn't been raised before, I don't believe 
20 you can amend the contract without writing. 
21 THE COURT1: Let me ask this: Assuming 
22 you are correct, how theni ctoen one qo about resolving 
2 3 t h o pir in iimn i \ i Mr..mo i in I In i n ra i l ' iiiini II I 11• 11 i "., t l i e 
24 a I locat ion o I t, axes ? 
25 MR- NELSON: The contract, 
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1 THE COURT: The contract doesn't say 
2 anything. 
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t a x j 'nn fin i d i 1 I n In i iiiiii > 
1
 "he rujGOTi T pd id t h e t a x e s nt thn4" t ime 
e l i m i n a t e t h e h a s s l e s , Because we WPM1 t a l k i n g 
a b o u t devr lopiinj in in inn MMI n n 11 in m i inr i 
l i q u n e d tha t i1 wi.ihl1 . I I e y«"> kmiw, > hi»t someth" 
would happen j n I he IIPKJ yiiii w h a t e v e r , and 1 d i d n ' t 
W e i l l L i i 1 <*)U I li' II I III III II I I I i I ill , l l l O l < 
Q hid yuti ei I sci believe that the property 
t. he next year could Jbe spilt of I into two separate 
taxi 
A Yes, T did. 
Q fi'o t h e n a r e y o n t e l l i n q me t h a t t h e 
i easni'i, \ :» pa i ^ ' he i > 'n iu ' I"1 n i 1 , ' ' WHI |"ii". ' I n J11 
I lie h a s s l e for* I. hat one y e a r ? 
A Yes . 
Q in Il I In ri "i"  n I I l was p. j j .d t h e s a m e 
way for the next two years, why did you do 'that? 
A Same reasons, 
Q :, mi mi «-ii i . h I II in 11 in I i i" i e p a j a I u 11 11 :i t < i t wo 
p a r c e l s? 
A Yes, 
Q h i II mi im II II i mi \ i IIIIII r. llML'U lii j MI i i i I i i i t h a t . 
A I asked h i id the second time I talked __ 
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w i s h e s , and m s t w d d o;l ooininq 1 orv u\ m d and iiiiiieHi i..11«i I n s 
r e s p o n s i b i l I t i e s , s ti c h a s I, o p i: o v i d e t h e c o u i' t a n d 
p r o v i d e c o u n s e l a i l documents which r e l a t e i n any way 
t o t h i s • 
There .is n o t h i n g b e f o r e me t o c r e a t e a b e l i e f 
] i" inn1 ! IIii11 there Iin i' documents t h a t somehow o b j e c t t o 
I 1 i i f a J l o c a t i o n u J 1 . h o l a x i . Il iiiiiii • i . • i • 11 I 111 I i <. | I I in ill M r . 
Wade's; t e s t i m o n y i s t h a t t h e r e a r e p e r h a p s some 
•spons » ' I In " r t t e r r , E x h i b i 1 P '" «i h a r d l y 
c r e d i t any nl t hobo when I dint t honi lliiu i i in lioiiil of 
into Th i s l a i J u r e t o be i n v o l v e d In t lit1 a p p r o p r i a t e 
iiiiiiini'i iinl I 111 I lii ii 11) 11 |n i a t e e v i d e n c e i n th m r oa* o 
continued even aitei .ill I lie payments were 
the contract in question 
II | « | . i | . I II i I | i , ] i | i 1 n l p , |
 ampt I j m p in 
19B? And so t h a t t h e e u t o i i on l l io i a l l o c a t i o n i hoiold 
niol he at 1 hat d a t e , but i n s t e a d shou ld bo at t h e l a t e r 
II II i Jl II I , 1 1 1 1 1 1 III III I II ill 1 III I III III I I 1 1 1 I I I i II III I III III I I III I i, l i i l 
t ax p u r p o s e s . 
(",') n e t: hi L n g 111 a t 1 w a s a f f e c t e d b y i r i c h o o s i n g 
i mi „, j e d J, i t h e l o c i iino j,'1 t Mi" '-II • 111 ii] I I ' 1i" -i c i" e d 11 t h e 
testimony of; MT , Wade is the interplay ol Lwo items: 
Number one, it: is very clear that Mr. Wade has qone 
I 11 r o n q l i a p \ o i "eo i 11 n i j i n \J i»II */ I IH,| 1 i a m l , I h \ I" iLijie a 1 s o 
testified that lie did everything J n stiicL accordance 
125 
Exhibit K 
A. Paul Schwenke #3951 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
175 South West Temple #300 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-1029 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
STANLEY L. WADE, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ] 
F.C. STANGL III ) 
Defendant. ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF A. PAUL 
» SCHWENKE IN SUPPORT OF 
» PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
> Case No.C87-357 
Honorable Michael Murphy 
I, A. Paul Schwenke, after being first duly sworn, deposed 
and says s 
1. I am the attorney of record for the Plaintiff, Stanley 
L. Wade, and in said capacity I have acquired personal knowledge 
of the facts stated herein except where specifically stated the 
statement is of the best knowledge or belief. 
2. I have good faith belief that the Defendant sold a 
larger portion of one large parcel of commercial property to the 
Plaintiff. The Defendant retained a smaller frontage portion of 
the land with a building on it. The Plaintiff took the larger 
rear acreage. 
3. The parcels have not been segregated for tax purposes, 
so the larger parcel is taxed as one unit. The parcels cannot 
be segregated until a warranty deed is recorded showing the 
partial conveyance. 
1 00400 
specific performance, requiring the Defendant to deliver a 
warranty deed pursuant to the real estate contract. 
5. Based on information I obtained from the Salt Lake 
County Assessor's Office, I have discovered that the portion of 
the land bought by the Plaintiff had a gross market value of 
$20,000.00 per acre. I also discovered that the portion of the 
land retained by the Defendant had a gross market valuation of 
$20,000 per acre for commercial acre, $2.00 per square foot for 
commercial square footage, and a gross market value for 
improvements. 
6. That I consulted with the Salt Lake County Assessor's 
office and the Salt Lake County Treasurer's office, and based on 
the information provided by each office, I was able to construct 
or determine the amount of property taxes actually accrued to the 
Plaintiff's portion of the land. The said computation is 
included in the memorandum in support of Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment. 
7. That the real estate contract between the parties award 
attorney fees, costs and expenses to the non-defaulting party. 
8. That I have charged $10,042.00 in attorney fees to date 
in connection with this case, itemised as follows: 
Date Service performed Hours Rate Amount 
12/18/86 Interview client about case .50 80.00 40.00 
01/ /87 Conference with Stangl 2.00 80.00 160.00 
01/19/87 Prep. Summons & Complaint 2.00 80.00 160.00 
02/24/87 Telephone Conf. with Crocket .25 80.00 20.00 
10/13/87 Review file .20 80.00 16.00 
10/14/87 Telephone conf. with Crocket .20 80.00 16.00 
03/20/88 Answer interog. Admissions 2.00 80.00 160.00 
Cf4-n! 
11/20/88 
12/05/88 
12/22/88 
01/19/89 
02/11/89 
02/12/89 
02/19/89 
02/17/89 
03/21/89 
03/27/89 
04/03/89 
04/11/89 
04/12/89 
04/13/89 
04/25/89 
06/20/89 
06/25/89 
06/25/89 
06/25/89 
06/26/89 
06/27/89 
06/08/89 
06/09/89 
06/09/89 
10/24/89 
11/13/89 
02/23/90 
03/09/90 
03/15/90 
03/16/90 
03/20/90 
03/21/90 
03/22/90 
Review -file & motion to amend 
Telephone con-f. counsel 
Review mot. Sum. Jud & ans/co 
Prepare statement in Opposition 
Prep. & file 59(e) motion 
Prepare & file Req. for hearing 
Prepare & serve Notice 
Prep. Wade aff. 8< meet to sign 
Hearing 
Prep 2nd 59(e) motion, a-f-f etc. 
Prepare Notice to Submit 
Prepare & file Notice of Appeal 
Telephone Conf. Dan Jensen 
Prep. Appl . for Stay Order etc. 
Court appearance Supersedeas 
Court appear. Judge Rigtrup 
Telephone conf. Deana AIRD INS. 
Prepare Docketing Statement, 
motion for summary disposition, 
memorandum and affidavits 
Prepare & file motion & Order 
to show cause 
Prepare & file memorandum and 
motion for sanctions 
Meet with Blake Jessop, SLC 
county assessor's office 
Obtain tax ledger from 
Treasurer's office and met 
with Tax Assessor 
Prepare and file motion for 
summary judgment, memorandum, 
affidavits. Meet with Stan 
Wade. 
2.00 
.50 
1 .50 
i 1.00 
11 .00 
.50 
.50 
2.00 
2.00 
13.00 
.20 
.50 
.30 
6.00 
1 .00 
1 .00 
1 .00 
20.00 
2.00 
4.00 
3.00 
3.00 
80.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
160.00 
45.00 
135.00 
90.00 
990.00 
45.00 
45.00 
180.00 
180.00 
1,170.00 
18.00 
45.00 
27.00 
540.00 
90.00 
90.00 
90.00 
1 ,800.00 
180.00 
360.00 
270.00 
270.00 
24.00 90.00 2.160.00 
TOTAL % 10.042.00 
9. That the Plaintiff has incurred the -following costs in 
connection with the prosecution of this case. 
Fil ing fees 
Service fees 
Supreme Court filing fees 
Appeal fees, district court 
Photo copies: 
01/19/87 
03/20/88 
01/19/89 
75.00 
22.00 
125.00 
35.00 
2.60 
2.00 
.40 
3 00402 
02/21/89 16.00 
03/17/89 .40 
03/21/89 .40 
03/27/89 2.40 
04/13/89 11.00 
04/25/89 .40 
06/20/89 .40 
06/25/89 9.20 
06/27/89 17.00 
07/10/89 95.00 
10/24/89 1.40 
11/13/89 8.40 
03/22/90 11.00 
Lost interest -from ceased funds $5. 750 . 00 
TOTAL $6,185.r-
10. That the total cost to Plaintiff, to date, as a dire 
result of this law suit to en-force his contractual rights 
$16,227.00. A 
Dated this <^__ day of March, 1990. 
A. Paul Schwenke 
A. Paul Schwenke, appeared personally be-fore me and stated 
to me under oath that he knows o-f the above facts to be true 
except the facts he stated to be his belief. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^^ day of March, 
1 9 9 0 . 
My Comnr 
J 
d s s i o n 
/ 
/ v 
i 
I nsp i res 
Sir 
* 
• • 
Ur V 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residing 
in Salt Lake County. 
4 00403 
The subject property was taxed during the relevant time 
based on three separate valuation units; to wit: (1) Commercial 
square -footage; (2) Commercial acreage and (3) Improvements. 
Beginning with the tax year 1978, each o-f the units had gross 
market valuation (GMV) as -follows: 
1. $2.00 per square -foot o-f -frontage, 
2. $20,000 per commercial acreage. 
3. $6,225.00 -for improvements. 
Please see Exh i bi t C. 
It is undisputed that the Plainti-f-f bought 6.87 acres o-f 
rear property assessed only as commercial acreage. Aoreemen t, 
para. 13. It is -further not disputed that the only improvement 
was located on the portion o-f the property retained by the 
Defendant. Ulade af-f i dav i t , para. The GMU as per each 
valuation unit in 1978, by each party is as -follows: 
GMV: <Data -from tax ledger -for tax years 1978, 1979 and 1980, a 
true and exact copy is attached hereto as Exh i bi t G, 
Val uat i on Un i t Wade Stanol Total 
1. Commercial Sq. Ft. -0- $ 30,000.00 $ 30,000.00 
2. Commercial Acreage $137,400.00 $ 75,100.00 $212,500.00 
3. Improvements -0- $ 6,225.00 $ 6,225.00 
Grand Totals $137,400.00 $111,325.00 $248,725.00 
PERCENTAGE QF LAND GMV; 
The percentage o-f the total land valuation attributable to each 
o-f the parties are computed as -follows: 
<a)Ulade (b)Stanol (c)Total 
Total land assessment $137,400.00 105,100.00 $242,500.00 
Percentage of total (a)/ (c) (b)/(c) 
=56.66X =43.347. 
EXHIBIT A 
7 0C383 
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